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DECIPHERING THE SUPREMACY OF 
FEDERAL FUNDING CONDITIONS: WHY 
STATE OPEN RECORDS LAWS MUST  
YIELD TO FERPA 
Abstract: The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) re-
quires that universities receiving federal funds through the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education maintain baseline student privacy protections. Simul-
taneously, state open records laws require public universities, as state 
actors, to disclose certain types of information upon a request from the 
public. When both statutes apply to requested information, courts have 
reached opposite results as to the universities’ obligations. Some have 
concluded that the records must remain private because of FERPA. Oth-
ers have concluded that the state open records law requires disclosure re-
gardless, because FERPA is merely a funding condition and not a federal 
prohibition. This Note proposes a framework for more uniformly resolv-
ing the relationship between FERPA and state open records laws. It ar-
gues that FERPA is a valid federal conditional funding statute under the 
current unconstitutional conditions doctrine. As a result, the Supremacy 
Clause must dictate the outcome when FERPA and a state open records 
law conflict. Therefore, when a state open records law would require dis-
closure of information protected by FERPA, FERPA must trump the con-
tradictory state law requirements as a binding federal law. 
Introduction 
 In May 2009, the Chicago Tribune ran a series, “Clout Goes to Col-
lege,” in which it revealed the existence of a list of well-connected ap-
plicants maintained by the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.1 
Some of the prospective students on the list were admitted to the uni-
versity despite poor academic qualifications.2 “Category I,” the Univer-
sity of Illinois’s private ranking system for applicants with connections 
to high-powered politicians and other wealthy influencers, had been a 
well-kept secret, known only to those who benefitted from it and those 
                                                                                                                      
1 Jodi S. Cohen et al., Clout Goes to College, Chi. Trib., May 29, 2009, § 1, at 1. The Trib-
une publishes regular updates to this story online. See Watchdog, Chi. Trib., http://www. 
chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/college/ (last visited May 13, 2012). 
2 Cohen et al., supra note 1. 
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within the admissions office, many of whom resisted it.3 Outrage en-
sued throughout the state upon the revelation that a public university 
was engaging in practices typical of the most elite private universities.4 
In response, the university formed a task force to review its admissions 
practices.5 By October, the university had new policies “aimed at keep-
ing clout out of admissions.”6 
 To gain access to the information needed to expose this scandal, 
the Tribune filed requests under Illinois’s Freedom of Information Act, 
which permits members of the public to inspect the records of state 
entities.7 Through these requests, the Tribune received over 1800 pages 
of documents.8 These documents redacted student names, grades, test 
scores, and other information which the Tribune believed was critical to 
revealing the extent of the scandal.9 Nonetheless, the Tribune’s exposé 
hit hard; the university’s president and nearly every trustee resigned 
following the revelation of the clout list.10 Despite the success of the 
initial series, the Tribune persisted in seeking access to the names and 
records of current students who benefitted from the list.11 In response 
to the Tribune’s continued requests, the university claimed that it was 
prohibited from disclosing that information by the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), a federal statute conditioning 
the receipt of federal funds on universities’ compliance with baseline 
student privacy protections.12 
                                                                                                                      
3 See id. 
4 See id. (quoting a college counselor who said, “This is not a private institution. This is 
yours and mine. Our flagship state university should not be a part of any political shenani-
gans.”); Jodi S. Cohen, No-Clout Rules Get 1st Test at U. of I., Chi. Trib., Oct. 29, 2009, § 1, at 
1. 
5 Cohen, supra note 4. 
6 Id. 
7 Cohen et al., supra note 1; see 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/3(a) (West Supp. 2011). 
8 Cohen et al., supra note 1. 
9 See id. 
10 See Cohen, supra note 4; Tara Malone, Two U. of I. Trustees Still Ignore Quinn’s Call for 
Resignations, Chi. Trib., Aug. 23, 2009, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-
quinn-trustee-22-aug23,0,2541140.story. Additionally, former Illinois governor Rod Blago-
jevich’s own impeachment likely included investigation into his involvement with the clout 
list. Tara Malone et al., Blagojevich’s Role Probed as Panel Queries U. of I. Trustees, Chi. Trib., 
July 15, 2009, § 1, at 1. 
11 See Brief of Appellant at 5, Chi. Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Ill. Bd. of Trs., 781 F. 
Supp. 2d 672 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-2066) [hereinafter Ill. Appellant Brief]. 
12Id. Universities often cite FERPA to avoid disclosing requested information. See Mat-
thew R. Salzwedel & Jon Ericson, Cleaning Up Buckley: How the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act Shields Academic Corruption in College Athletics, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1053, 1061. 
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 FERPA is one of many federal statutes regulating the higher educa-
tion sector through Congress’s power to attach conditions to its spend-
ing.13 By placing conditions on the receipt of federal funds, Congress 
may use the carrot of federal funding to achieve federal policy goals in 
areas traditionally of state concern, like education.14 Such efforts are 
invariably successful because most universities, including public univer-
sities, depend on federal funds in the form of student financial aid, re-
search grants, and other financial resources to survive.15 
 In addition, state legislatures also regulate the education sector, in 
particular by placing obligations on public universities.16 At times, state 
laws seeking to achieve local policy goals place requirements on public 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Leo H. Bradley, School Law for Public, Private, and Parochial Educa-
tors 13 (2005); William A. Kaplin & Barbara A. Lee, A Legal Guide for Student 
Affairs Professionals 673–74 (2d ed. 2009); Stephen B. Thomas et al., Public School 
Law: Teachers’ and Students’ Rights 12–15 (6th ed. 2009). Article I, section 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the . . . general 
Welfare of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. In 1936, in United States v. Butler, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress may use this power to spend federal funds broadly. 
See 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). Other federal statutes placing funding conditions on universities 
include Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, section 504 of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act of 2008. See Kaplin & Lee, supra, at 725; Barbara A. Lee, Fifty Years of 
Higher Education Law: Turning the Kaleidoscope, 36 J.C. & U.L. 649, 649, 650–51 (2010). 
14 See Bradley, supra note 13, at 13, 17; Thomas R. Baker, State Preemption of Federal 
Law: The Strange Case of College Student Disciplinary Records Under F.E.R.P.A., 149 Educ. L. 
Rep. 283, 297 n.57 (2001); see also David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spend-
ing Power, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 496, 535 (2007) (“Congress today probably directs more 
human behavior by conditions accompanying federal funding than by any exercise of its 
legislative powers.”). Numerous scholars have noted that Congress has often used its 
spending power to achieve regulations that would be impermissible under Congress’s oth-
er powers. See John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chap. 
L. Rev. 63, 64 (2001); Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 Sup. Ct. Econ. 
Rev. 165, 167–68 (2008); William E. Thro, The Education Lawyer’s Guide to the Sovereign Im-
munity Revolution, 146 Educ. L. Rep. 951, 977 (2000). 
15 See David E. Bernstein, You Can’t Say That!: The Growing Threat to Civil Lib-
erties from Antidiscrimination Laws 143 (2003); Baker, supra note 14, at 298; see also 
Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 722–25 (describing types of federal funds for universities). See 
generally Ass’n of Pub. & Land-Grant Univs., Ensuring Public Research Universities 
Remain Vital: A Report to the Membership on the Research University Regional 
Deliberations (2010) [hereinafter Research Universities], available at http://www.edu 
cation.virginia.gov/initiatives/highereducation/EnsuringPublicResearchUniversitiesRemain 
Strong.pdf (calling for improved federal-state financial partnerships to sustain public univer-
sities); Nat’l Conference on State Legislatures Fiscal Affairs Program, State Fund-
ing for Higher Education in FY 2009 and FY 2010 (2010), available at http://www.ncsl. 
org/documents/fiscal/HigherEdFundingFINAL.pdf (demonstrating that states increasingly 
rely on federal funds to support public universities). 
16 See Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 13, 648, 657. 
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universities that conflict with those attached to federal funding.17 This 
conflict is particularly vivid in the case of FERPA and state open records 
laws.18 Open records laws often require public universities, as state ac-
tors, to make many of their records available to the public upon re-
quest.19 As a result, when university officials receive an open records 
request that would require disclosure of particular students’ identities, 
they must weigh their obligations as federal fund recipients against 
their legal duties under state law.20 
 When asked to help universities resolve this conflict, courts have 
taken divergent approaches.21 In 2002, in United States v. Miami Univer-
sity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Miami 
University did not need to disclose student disciplinary records re-
quested by the Chronicle of Higher Education, because FERPA’s privacy 
requirements were exempt from the state open records law.22 But in 
2011, in Chicago Tribune Co. v. University of Illinois Board of Trustees, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that FERPA 
does not prohibit the University of Illinois from disclosing personally 
identifiable information about students on its clout list to the Chicago 
Tribune under the state open records law.23 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA in the Twenty-First Century: Failure to Effectively Regulate 
Privacy for All Students, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 59, 92, 113 (2008). 
18 See id. 
19 See Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 661; Daggett, supra note 17, at 97. 
20 See Ill. Appellant Brief, supra note 11, at 11. Scholars have criticized FERPA for ena-
bling universities to hide scandalous information under the guise of protecting student 
privacy. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Tattoos, Tickets, and Other Tawdry Behavior: How Universi-
ties Use Federal Law to Hide Their Scandals, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1555, 1556–57 (2012) (“The 
goal is nondisclosure. The chorus is student privacy. The tool: the FERPA defense.”); 
Salzwedel & Ericson, supra note 12, at 1112 (“It is sadly ironic that institutions whose rea-
son for being is to search for truth are home to at best a myth—at worst, a lie—shielded by 
the Buckley Amendment [FERPA].”). But at least one scholar has argued that FERPA and 
state open records laws are easily reconcilable by simply releasing segregated, redacted 
student data. See Richard J. Peltz, From the Ivory Tower to the Glass House: Access to “De-
Identified” Public University Admission Records to Study Affirmative Action, 25 Harv. BlackLet-
ter L.J. 181, 185, 196 (2009). Nonetheless, universities face frequent requests from news 
outlets for nonredacted information, such as for the grades of the members of an athletic 
team. See Salzwedel & Ericson, supra note 12, at 1054–56. 
21 Compare Chi. Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Ill. Bd. of Trs., 781 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676–77 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that FERPA requirements do not excuse a university from state 
open records law requirements), argued, No. 11-2066 (7th Cir. Sept. 30, 2011), with United 
States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that FERPA require-
ments prohibit disclosure under state open records law). 
22 294 F.3d at 804, 811. The United States, on behalf of the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion (the “Department”), had requested an injunction to prohibit Miami University from 
releasing the records. See id. at 804. 
23 781 F. Supp. 2d at 676–77. 
2012] The Supremacy of FERPA over State Open Records Laws 1049 
 Although numerous education law scholars have noted the con-
flict between FERPA and state open records laws, none have yet ex-
plored this conflict in light of the significant power of conditional fund-
ing statutes to displace state law under the Supremacy Clause.24 This 
Note fills that gap by examining when Congress permissibly may use its 
power to place conditions on federal spending to influence the behav-
ior of educational institutions, even to the extent of displacing state 
law.25 
 This Note argues that courts reviewing conflicts between FERPA 
and state open records laws have failed to employ the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine—the appropriate analytical framework to resolve 
the conflict—and as a result have reached vastly different outcomes on 
similar facts.26 Relying predominantly on an assessment of how critical 
federal funds are to a university, some courts have identified FERPA as 
an applicable federal law whose requirements must either displace or be 
exempt from state law.27 Meanwhile, others have interpreted FERPA as a 
contractual agreement whose terms must cede to state law.28 This Note 
argues that FERPA should be recognized as a binding federal law not 
because universities could not survive without federal funds or because 
it represents good policy, but because FERPA is a valid conditional fund-
ing statute whose terms a federal fund recipient has accepted.29 There-
fore, when assessing conflicts between FERPA and state open records 
laws, courts should utilize the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in South Dakota 
v. Dole, to determine whether FERPA is a constitutional use of Congress’s 
spending power.30 If a court concludes that it is, as nearly every court 
will under the current doctrine, then FERPA must fall within an exemp-
                                                                                                                      
24 See Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 273; Baker, supra note 14, at 283, 297 n.57; Dag-
gett, supra note 17, at 92, 113. 
25 See infra notes 32–44 and accompanying text. Underlying this question is an explora-
tion of the extent to which the federal government’s policy goals in areas of traditional 
state concern may displace state goals through the carrot of federal funding. See Lynn A. 
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States’ Rights, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. 
Sci. 104, 104, 105 (2001) (arguing that Congress’s spending power and ability to place 
conditions on funds presents “the greatest threat to autonomy”). 
26 See supra note 21. 
27 See, e.g., Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 804, 811 (concluding that FERPA prohibits certain 
disclosures, and holding that the records at issue could not be disclosed because the Ohio 
Public Records Act’s “federal law” exemption includes FERPA). 
28 See, e.g., Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 587, 589 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (concluding 
that FERPA imposes a penalty for, but does not prohibit, disclosure and holding that 
FERPA does not fall within the Missouri Sunshine Law’s “federal law” exemption). 
29 See infra notes 30–285 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 290–298 and accompanying text. 
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tion to the state open records law, or else, pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause, displace the state law to the extent of the conflict.31 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the purpose, scope, and 
terms of FERPA and state open records laws.32 Part II examines the in-
teraction of FERPA and state open records laws in cases brought in 
both state and federal courts, showing that courts are split on how to 
resolve the conflict.33 Part II further illustrates the variety of approaches 
courts use to resolve the conflict.34 
 Part III introduces both the Supremacy Clause and the Spending 
Clause and examines their relationship.35 It provides an overview of the 
Dole criteria and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for assessing 
the constitutionality of conditions on federal funds.36 It then briefly 
discusses scholarly perspectives on whether these criteria sufficiently 
preserve the federalism values underlying the division of federal and 
state power.37 The Part concludes that, despite Dole’s flaws, the Dole cri-
teria remain the predominant mechanism for determining whether a 
conditional funding statute is valid such that the Supremacy Clause 
may attach to it.38 
                                                                                                                     
 Part IV returns to FERPA to conduct a brief analysis of its constitu-
tionality using Dole and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.39 It 
identifies some areas of concern, particularly regarding the question of 
state consent to federal funding conditions.40 But Part IV ultimately 
concludes that in most states, FERPA will meet the Dole criteria for a val-
id conditional funding statute.41 Finally, based on the findings of Part 
IV, Part V suggests an analytical framework for courts reviewing conflicts 
between FERPA and state open records laws.42 It argues that courts 
should conduct a Dole analysis to recognize FERPA as binding law when 
its terms have been validly accepted.43 This approach acknowledges 
Congress’s authority to utilize its spending power to achieve certain be-
haviors and also ensures that states are actually consenting to waiving 
 
31 See infra notes 299–301 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 46–105 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 106–154 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 155–161 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 162–227 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 187–220 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 221–225 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 224–227 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 228–285 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 246–282 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 283–285 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 286–305 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 290–305 and accompanying text. 
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the right to impose contrary regulations in exchange for receiving fed-
eral funds.44 Thus, where FERPA survives the Dole test, it must either fall 
within an exemption to a state open records law or displace it, in accor-
dance with the Supremacy Clause.45 
I. FERPA and State Open Records Laws: Competing Policies 
 A significant tension arises between two core democratic con-
cepts—individual privacy and the public’s right to know about the gov-
ernment’s activities—in the context of public universities.46 Students’ 
records, which are maintained by public universities as state actors, 
contain grades, disciplinary proceeding reports, and an array of other 
information that a student or the university may desire to keep pri-
vate.47 These records often contain the very information that news me-
dia seek in order to expose questionable university practices or policies 
and to hold public universities accountable to the public.48 Given these 
competing interests, states and the federal government have passed 
regulatory schemes that protect student privacy yet provide public ac-
cess to the records of state actors.49 This Part provides an overview of 
student record privacy protections, as embodied in FERPA, and the 
                                                                                                                      
44 See infra notes 302–305 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 299–301 and accompanying text. 
46 See Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 273. The concept of privacy has long served as 
an important tenet in guiding the relationship between the private person and the public 
sphere, and particularly in limiting the scope of the government’s ability to compel the 
disclosure of personal information. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195–97 (1890) (providing an early and influential discussion 
of the right to privacy at common law); see also Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Perspective 
on Privacy, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 897, 897–99 (2000) (noting the article’s influence and de-
scribing the concept of informational privacy, or “exemption from scrutiny”). Additionally, 
freedom of information and the right to know about the government’s activities are also 
values central to a democratic society. See Peter Molnar, The Paradox of Informed Participa-
tion: What Universities Can Do for Freedom of Information, 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics 
J. 571, 571 (2009); Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart, Let the Sunshine In, or Else: An Examination of 
the “Teeth” of State and Federal Open Meetings and Open Records Laws, 15 Comm. L. & Pol’y 
265, 265 (2010). If the government is truly to be accountable to the people, the people 
must be informed of what their government is doing. See Herbert N. Foerstel, Freedom 
of Information and the Right to Know: The Origins and Applications of the 
Freedom of Information Act 15–16 (1999); Stewart, supra, at 268. 
47 See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellant at 7–8, Chicago Tribune, 781 F. Supp. 2d 672 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-
2066) [hereinafter EPIC Brief]; Daggett, supra note 17, at 75. 
48 See Daggett, supra note 17, at 113. See generally Reporter’s Guide to FERPA, Soc’y of 
Prof. Journalists, http://www.spj.org/ferpa.asp (last visited May 13, 2012) (offering 
guidance to journalists seeking to gain access to information shielded by FERPA). 
49 See Thomas et al., supra note 13, at 99–100. 
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right of access to the records of public entities, as granted by state open 
records laws.50 
A. FERPA 
 FERPA is one of many state and federal statutes regulating privacy 
by prohibiting the disclosure of personal information.51 FERPA condi-
tions receipt of federal funds upon a university’s protection against dis-
closure of personally identifiable information in students’ education 
records.52 Congress enacted FERPA to protect student privacy in light 
of increasing concern about the use of student records, particularly at 
the postsecondary level.53 Senator James Buckley, one of the authors of 
the Joint Statement in Explanation of the Buckley/Pell Amendment 
(the only official indication of legislative intent), was concerned about 
“systematic violations of the privacy of students . . . through . . . the un-
authorized, inappropriate release of personal data.”54 To address this 
problem, Congress sought to establish a baseline of federal privacy pro-
tection, allowing the states to create additional protections if desired.55 
 Congress enacted FERPA pursuant to its power under the Spend-
ing Clause to spend for the general welfare and its accompanying au-
thority to place conditions on the receipt of federal funds.56 FERPA 
                                                                                                                      
50 See infra notes 51–105 and accompanying text. 
51 See Richard Brusca & Colin Ram, A Failure to Communicate: Did Privacy Laws Contribute 
to the Virginia Tech Tragedy?, 17 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 141, 144–45 (2010). 
For example, the Privacy Act of 1974 limits federal agencies’ collection and disclosure of 
personal information. See Foerstel, supra note 46, at 65. 
52 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). FERPA states, “No funds shall be 
made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution 
which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally 
identifiable information contained therein other than directory information . . . ) of stu-
dents without [their] written consent.” Id. § 1232g(b)(1). FERPA also grants students af-
firmative rights to inspect and request to amend their records. Id. § 1232g(a)(1)(A). The 
Department is responsible for promulgating regulations in furtherance of FERPA. See id. 
§ 1232g(c). 
53 See Joint Statement in Explanation of Buckley/Pell Amendment, 120 Cong. Rec. 
39,862–63 (1974) [hereinafter Joint Statement]; Senator Buckley’s Address Before the 
Legislative Conference of the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 121 Cong. Rec. 
13,990–91 (1975) [hereinafter Buckley]. 
54 Buckley, supra note 53, at 13,991. FERPA passed as an amendment on the floor and 
therefore lacks traditional legislative history to shed light on Congress’s intent. See Legislative 
History of Major FERPA Provisions, U.S. Department of Educ., 1, http://www.ed.gov/ 
policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/ferpaleghistory.pdf (last updated June 2002) [hereinafter Legis-
lative History]. 
55 See Joint Statement, supra note 53, at 39,863 (indicating that FERPA sets “a mini-
mum Federal standard for record confidentiality and access”). 
56 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987). 
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thus applies to any “educational agency or institution” that receives 
federal funds from the U.S. Department of Education (the “Depart-
ment”).57 As a result, practically every public, private, and sectarian 
higher education institution in the United States meets this criterion.58 
This is because federal funds, in the form of grants and student finan-
cial aid, are essential to university operations.59 In fact, even if only one 
student at a university receives federal financial assistance, the univer-
sity as a whole is considered to receive federal funds for the purposes of 
FERPA and other federal education laws.60 
 FERPA applies to “education records,” which the Department de-
fines as records “[d]irectly related to a student” and “[m]aintained by 
an educational agency or institution.”61 At the postsecondary level, 
FERPA provides students with certain rights regarding the privacy and 
                                                                                                                      
57 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (conditioning funds on compliance); id. § 1232g(a)(3) 
(defining “educational agency or institution”). 
58 See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 143; Baker, supra note 14, at 298. Given the high cost 
of maintaining a higher education institution and educating a student, it is nearly impossible 
for an institution, public or private, to survive without allowing students to offset the tuition 
costs with federal financial aid. See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 143. Currently, it appears that 
there are only four private higher education institutions in the United States that do not 
receive federal funds and therefore are not bound by FERPA: Grove City College in Pennsyl-
vania, Hillsdale College in Michigan, Patrick Henry College in Virginia, and Principia Col-
lege in Illinois. See James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-
Discrimination Laws Take Aim at First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 961, 988 
n.188 (2011); Financial Aid: Private Student Loans, Patrick Henry C., http://www.phc. 
edu/Private_Student_Loans.php (last visited May 13, 2012); Frequently Asked Questions, Prin-
cipia C., http://www.principiacollege.edu/admissions/financial-aid/faq (last visited May 13, 
2012). 
59 See EPIC Brief, supra note 47, at 13–16 (discussing the extent to which public univer-
sities rely upon federal funds); Research Universities, supra note 15, at 12–13, 15. 
60 See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984); Bernstein, supra note 15, 
at 142–43. 
61 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2011). The precise definition of “education record” has been 
the subject of a Supreme Court case and numerous revisions to FERPA. See Owasso Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. I-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 430, 436 (2002); Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up 
Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records Statute Work, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 617, 620–22 
(1997). The regulations currently indicate six categories of information within “education 
records” that are not covered by FERPA: “sole possession” records, such as professor’s 
memory aids; law enforcement records; employment records, but not including those of 
students who are employees as a result of their student status; medical records; alumni 
records created after the individual is no longer a student; and grades on peer-graded 
assignments before a teacher collects and records them. 34 C.F.R. § 99.3; see Owasso, 534 
U.S. at 430, 436 (holding that peer-graded assignments were not education records under 
FERPA and instigating a revision to the FERPA regulations). 
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disclosure of their education records.62 First, FERPA prohibits the non-
consensual disclosure of “personally identifiable information” contained 
in a student’s education record.63 Second, in addition to limiting the 
disclosures an institution can make without student consent, FERPA 
gives students a number of affirmative rights regarding their educa-
tional records.64 Students have the right to inspect and review their edu-
cation records, to request amendment of records if they believe them to 
be inaccurate or otherwise to violate their rights under FERPA, to con-
sent to disclosure of otherwise protected information, to file a com-
plaint of an alleged FERPA violation with the Department, and to be 
notified annually by the institution of these rights.65 
 Despite these protections, FERPA allows educational institutions to 
disclose student information in a number of situations.66 FERPA permits 
institutions to disclose anonymous information, often in the form of 
aggregate data, as long as the disclosure does not reveal any individual 
students’ identities.67 Additionally, FERPA permits the disclosure of per-
sonally identifiable information without student consent when others 
have a need to know because of their professional capacities, such as 
other school officials who have a “legitimate educational interest,” gov-
ernment representatives, or individuals conducting institutional accredi-
tation surveys.68 FERPA also permits (but does not appear to require) 
disclosure for an institutional disciplinary proceeding or to comply with 
a court order or subpoena.69 Further, after many amendments, FERPA 
now contains a number of exceptions to protect the safety of students 
                                                                                                                      
62 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). FERPA grants the rights to parents 
of K–12 students, but transfers these rights to students upon turning eighteen or enrolling 
at a postsecondary institution. See id. 
63 See id. § 1232g(b)(1). An institution may release any information if it obtains the 
student’s prior written consent. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.30. 
64 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a). 
65 34 C.F.R. § 99.7; see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1), (2). 
66 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.30 (permitting students to consent to disclosure); id. § 99.31; 
FERPA, 76 Fed. Reg. 75,641–42 (Dec. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 99.31) (de-
scribing permitted nonconsensual disclosures). 
67 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(b); Peltz, supra note 20, at 185, 196. Although such disclosures 
may redact traditional identifiers such as names and contact information, there remains 
the possibility that redacted records, on the whole, can nevertheless enable direct identifi-
cation of a student. See Clifford A. Ramirez, FERPA Clear and Simple: The College 
Professional’s Guide to Compliance 35 (2009). As a result, the FERPA regulations indi-
cate that an educational institution must “[make] a reasonable determination that a stu-
dent’s identity is not personally identifiable, whether through single or multiple releases, 
and taking into account other reasonably available information.” 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(b)(1). 
68 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a); FERPA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,641–42. 
69 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9), (14). 
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and others on campus, including information regarding sexual assault 
disciplinary proceedings and other campus crime information.70 
 In addition to permitting disclosures in certain situations, FERPA 
allows the general disclosure of “directory information” on the grounds 
that the disclosure of such information does not constitute an invasion 
of privacy.71 The FERPA regulations provide some examples of infor-
mation that can be classified as directory information, such as name, 
address, photograph, enrollment status, birthday, and degrees earned, 
and indicate that Social Security numbers and certain other identifica-
tion numbers cannot be classified as such.72 But the regulations do not 
provide an exhaustive list of either category.73 Institutions may deter-
mine what constitutes directory information and must publish their 
definitions in an annual notification.74 Students may request that their 
directory information be withheld; otherwise directory information 
may be released without authorization.75 
 The Department is tasked with enforcing FERPA through its Fam-
ily Policy Compliance Office (FPCO).76 Although FERPA serves impor-
tant individual privacy interests, it is enforceable only through agency 
action, not by the individuals whose information it protects.77 In 2002, 
in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that there is no 
                                                                                                                      
70 See id. § 99.31(a)(10), (13), (16); Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 270–71. Numerous 
students and scholars have written about these disclosures, many of which were added to 
the FERPA regulations following incidents in which universities did not disclose students’ 
suicidal tendencies or the identity of potential sexual assault perpetrators, thereby com-
promising student safety. See generally Brusca & Ram, supra note 51 (assessing whether 
FERPA and other privacy laws prohibit university officials from reporting a student’s risk of 
harming himself and others to parents); Katrina Chapman, A Preventable Tragedy at Virginia 
Tech: Why Confusion over FERPA’s Provisions Prevents Schools from Addressing Student Violence, 18 
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 349 (2009) (arguing that FERPA does not sufficiently accommodate the 
need for disclosure in emergency situations). 
71 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31, 99.37; FERPA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,641–642 (“Directory infor-
mation means information contained in an education record of a student that would not 
generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed.”). 
72 See FERPA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,641. 
73 See id. 
74 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.37; Ramirez, supra note 67, at 49. Institutions are supposed to clas-
sify as directory information only that information which it deems necessary. See Ramirez, 
supra note 67, at 44–45. The Family Policy Compliance Office, which enforces FERPA, 
recommends that universities not include race, gender, nationality, and religious affiliation 
in their definition of directory information, but it is not expressly prohibited by the regu-
lation. See id. at 50. 
75 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.37(b). 
76 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.60, 99.63. 
77 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002); see also Daggett, supra note 17, at 
64–65. 
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private right of action under FERPA.78 Instead, individuals may file 
complaints with the FPCO, which investigates potential violations and 
enforces FERPA at its discretion.79 Noncompliance may result in the 
withholding of federal funding, but the Department has never resorted 
to such measures.80 
 Despite the potentially significant penalties associated with non-
compliance with FERPA, the statute and its regulations are ambiguous 
in places and remain open to universities’ interpretations.81 In many 
instances where FERPA is unclear the Department’s regulations leave 
room for institutions to create their own definitions.82 Further, the Su-
preme Court rarely has stepped in to help define FERPA’s terms.83 As a 
result, universities often struggle to understand their specific obliga-
tions under FERPA.84 
B. State Open Records Laws 
 Congress and state legislatures have enacted open records laws to 
promote government accountability by providing access upon request 
to government records.85 The federal Freedom of Information Act 
                                                                                                                      
 
78 See 536 U.S. at 290. 
79 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.60, 99.63. 
80 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (indicating that “[n]o funds shall be made available under 
any applicable program to any educational agency or institution” if FERPA’s terms are 
violated); Ramirez, supra note 67, at 24, 27 (acknowledging that the Department has never 
withheld funds for noncompliance but noting that the threat remains credible and fosters 
compliance). 
81 See Daggett, supra note 17, at 92; Salzwedel & Ericson, supra note 12, at 1066–67. 
82 See Ramirez, supra note 67, at 27. For example, the FERPA regulations define “stu-
dent” as “an individual who is or has been in attendance at an educational agency or insti-
tution and regarding whom the agency or institution maintains education records.” 34 
C.F.R. § 99.3. Institutions may define for themselves when a student becomes “in atten-
dance.” See Ramirez, supra note 67, at 29–30. Further, who counts as a “student” has not 
been clearly defined for nontraditional student populations, for whom the “in attendance” 
requirement raises questions. See Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 107 (5th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that a student who was denied admission to a university’s graduate school but audited 
the university classes was not a “student” under FERPA); FERPA, Catholic U. of Am. Gen. 
Couns.’s Off., http://counsel.cua.edu/ferpa/questions/index.cfm (last updated July 6, 
2010) (answers attributed to Steven J. McDonald, General Counsel of the Rhode Island 
School of Design). 
83 See Daggett, supra note 17, at 63–64. 
84 See id. at 112–13. 
85 See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (re-
quiring that “[e]ach agency . . . make available to the public information” as described by 
the statute); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/3 (West Supp. 2011) (requiring that “[e]ach 
public body . . . make available to any person for inspection or copying all public records,” 
with some exceptions). Laws requiring disclosure of government records are known by 
many names. See Susan P. Stuart, A Local Distinction: State Education Privacy Laws for Public 
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(FOIA), passed in 1966, seeks to foster governmental transparency and 
an informed democratic society by granting access to the records of 
federal agencies and entities to the public.86 Similarly, state open re-
cords laws promote transparency and accountability by making gov-
ernment documents accessible for public inspection.87 To achieve these 
ends, state open records laws often contain a presumption of open-
ness—requiring the disclosure of records maintained by state entities 
upon request—and an instruction to construe the disclosure require-
ments liberally.88 Further, in 1988 in U.S. Department of Justice v. Julian, 
the Supreme Court held that courts should construe FOIA exemptions 
narrowly.89 Thus, most open records laws lean in favor of disclosure.90 
 Because they are state actors, public universities are usually bound 
by state open records laws.91 This means that any interested party may 
submit a written request under the state open records law to the public 
university as a state agency.92 Generally, the university must respond 
promptly to the request even if it believes the requested records fall 
within an exemption.93 An agency or university often has significant 
                                                                                                                      
Schoolchildren, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. 361, 388 (2005) (noting the various terms used for such 
laws). In this Note, the term “open records laws” will refer to freedom of information acts, 
right-to-know laws, public records laws, and, in some instances, sunshine laws. See id. 
86 See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978); Statement by the 
President Upon Signing the “Freedom of Information Act,” II Pub. Papers 699 ( July 4, 
1966). 
87 See Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 Urb. Law. 
65, 65, 66 (1996) (noting that most state statutes closely resemble the federal FOIA). The 
Illinois Freedom of Information Act, for example, begins with the premise that “all per-
sons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government” in 
order “to ensure that it is being conducted in the public interest.” 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
140/1. Such access “promotes the transparency and accountability of public bodies at all 
levels of government.” Id. 
88 See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/1, 1.2; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-216 (2000); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1 (West 2003); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.001 (West 2004). 
89 See 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988). 
90 See id.; Nowadzky, supra note 87, at 66. 
91 See Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 661. In some states, however, open records laws 
do not apply to public higher education institutions, because those states do not consider 
such institutions to be state agencies. See id. at 273. 
92 See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/3(c) (West Supp. 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-
216 (declaring that “public records shall be open for inspection by any person” (emphasis 
added)). 
93 See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/3(c), (d), (e) (requiring that the state agency 
reply to the request within five business days); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-218(d) (requiring 
agency reply “as soon as possible” and within three business days). 
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discretion as to whether to claim an applicable exemption or to disclose 
the requested information.94 
 Federal and state open records laws contain exemptions that rec-
ognize compelling policy concerns, such as individual privacy.95 State 
open records laws are fairly consistent in their exemption of disclosures 
that would constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”96 
Further, most state open records laws empower or even require courts 
to balance the interests of access and privacy to determine whether a 
certain record may be disclosed.97 
 State laws vary significantly in how they address exemptions for 
student records, which present additional privacy concerns.98 A num-
ber of state open records laws explicitly exempt student records.99 Oth-
ers exempt certain information that may appear in student records but 
do not exempt postsecondary student records generally.100 In some 
                                                                                                                      
 
94 See Alan Charles Raul, Privacy and the Digital State: Balancing Public In-
formation and Personal Privacy 27 (2002). The public entity seeking to claim an exemp-
tion carries the burden of proving the exemption’s applicability. See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. 140/1.2 (requiring Illinois public entities to prove exemption by clear and convincing 
evidence); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:31(3) (2007) (“The burden of proving that a public 
record is not subject to inspection, copying, or reproduction [rests] with the custodian [of 
the record].”); see also Nowadzky, supra note 87, at 66–69 & n.6 (providing additional state 
examples of agency burdens, both legislatively created and judicially imposed, of showing 
that exemption applies). But see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.243(1), (2) (West Supp. 2011) 
(providing a number of discretionary exemptions, but indicating a mandatory exemption for 
disclosures prohibited by FERPA). 
95 See Nowadzky, supra note 87, at 86, 90–91 (noting commonality of exemptions with 
two exceptions: Maryland, which delineates only two categories of confidential informa-
tion and defers significantly to the particular agency, and New Jersey, which defers excep-
tions entirely to the executive and judicial branches). Common exemptions include medi-
cal and personnel records, library records, trade secrets, law enforcement records, internal 
affairs investigations, and records protected under attorney-client privilege. See id. at 86–
89; see also Raul, supra note 94, at 26–27 (explaining FOIA’s exemptions). 
96 E.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(c) (West Supp. 2012); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
140/7(1)(c); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-221(30) (Supp. 2010); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. 
§ 15.243(1)(a); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 317(c)(12) (Supp. 2011). 
97 See Nowadzky, supra note 87, at 79. 
98 See Stuart, supra note 85, at 387–92. States also vary in whether they include student 
records within the definition of public records at all. Compare Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 149.43(A)(1) (West Supp. 2011) (including records maintained by schools in the defini-
tion of public records), with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1.1 (West Supp. 2011) (excluding 
postsecondary student records from the definition of public records). 
99 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(4) (Supp. 2011); Tex. Gov’t Code. Ann. 
§ 552.114 (West 2004); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 317(c)(11). 
100 See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/7(1)(j) (West Supp. 2011) (exempting exam in-
formation, faculty evaluation information from “academic peers,” faculty course and research 
materials, and student disciplinary adjudication information only if disclosure would reveal 
the student’s identity); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:4(16), (27) (West Supp. 2012) (exempting 
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states, education laws, rather than the state open records law, indicate 
that student records are exempt from disclosure requirements.101 Fur-
ther, some state open records laws specifically exempt disclosures that 
are otherwise prohibited by FERPA.102 Absent an explicit exemption 
for FERPA, however, the significant variation in statutory language 
means that state open records laws’ exemptions for student records 
may or may not align with FERPA’s definitions and requirements.103 
Nonetheless, despite variation in treatment of student records, most 
state open records laws contain a catch-all exemption for those disclo-
sures that are “otherwise prohibited” by another state or federal law.104 
Such exemptions are subject to judicial interpretation and frequently 
to an instruction to construe exemptions narrowly.105 
                                                                                                                     
II. Inconsistent Readings: Courts’ Divergent Approaches to 
Reconciling FERPA and State Open Records Laws 
 The tension between FERPA and state open records laws arises 
most often when a news outlet submits an open records request for stu-
dent information from a university.106 Often, the media want to know 
 
 
higher education institution’s records regarding trade secrets, patentable research, private 
document collections donated for preservation, and exam information); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 45-221(9), (17), (23) (exempting exam information, student financial aid application in-
formation, and library records); Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-616(k) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2011) (exempting only certain information contained in student records). 
101 See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 37-15-3 (Supp. 2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-402(e) 
(2011). 
102 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 40.25.120(a)(5) (2010); Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(b)(2) 
(Supp. 2011); Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.243(2) (West Supp. 2011). 
103 See Stuart, supra note 85, at 377–83 (discussing the different types of student privacy 
statutes and the variability in alignment with FERPA); Student Privacy: State Laws, Elec-
tronic Privacy Info. Center, http://epic.org/privacy/student/#state_laws (last visited 
May 13, 2012) (noting that, as of 2002, thirty-five states provide student record privacy 
protections beyond FERPA). 
104 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(k) (West Supp. 2012) (exempting from the dis-
closure requirements “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursu-
ant to federal or state law”); Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-72(a)(1) (Supp. 2011) (exempting 
records “[s]pecifically required by federal statute or regulation to be kept confidential”); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 45-221(a)(1) (exempting “[r]ecords the disclosure of which is specifi-
cally prohibited or restricted by federal law”); Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-615(2) 
(exempting records “the inspection [of which] would be contrary to a State statute [or] a 
federal statute or a regulation that is issued under the statute and has the force of law”). 
Similarly, the federal FOIA exempts documents whose disclosure is specifically prohibited 
by other statutes. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)–(9) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
105 See Nowadzky, supra note 87, at 66; cf. Julian, 486 U.S. at 8 (noting that federal FOIA 
exemptions are narrowly construed). 
106 See Paul J. Batista, Student Athletes and the Buckley Amendment: Right to Privacy Does Not 
Include Right to Sue, 14 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 319, 320–21 (2004) (describing scenarios in 
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about a sexual assault or other safety issue, a student-athlete’s academic 
performance, or a questionable policy of admitting well-connected stu-
dents.107 If the requester is satisfied with redacted records, then no issue 
arises—a university can comply with its obligations under FERPA not to 
disclose personally identifiable information and with state law require-
ments to disclose certain records.108 But if the requester seeks personally 
identifiable information from student records, courts must determine 
first whether FERPA applies to the requested disclosure and then 
whether FERPA falls within an exemption to the state open records 
law.109 
 Courts have approached this scenario in two ways.110 Section A de-
scribes some courts’ conclusion that FERPA functions like any other 
federal law and falls within the “otherwise prohibited” exemption to 
the state law.111 This results in no conflict between FERPA and the state 
open records laws, because the state law accommodates FERPA’s re-
quirements and allows the university not to disclose the information in 
compliance with both federal funding conditions and state law.112 Sec-
tion B describes other courts’ conclusion that FERPA is optional be-
cause it is a condition that arises only with the choice to receive federal 
funds, and thus it does not fall within the “otherwise prohibited” ex-
emption to the state law.113 As a result, there is a conflict between 
FERPA and the state open records laws, and universities are required 
both to disclose under state law and not to disclose under the terms 
attached to the federal funding they receive.114 Section C discusses the 
implications of this split.115 
                                                                                                                      
which the media might seek student-athlete information); Salzwedel & Ericson, supra note 
12, at 1054–57 (same). 
107 Cf. Charles N. Davis, Top Ten Story Ideas for FERPA Enterprisers, Soc’y Prof. Journal-
ists, http://www.spj.org/ferpa4.asp (last visited May 14, 2012) (providing a list for report-
ers of interesting story ideas that do not run into FERPA issues). 
108 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., Cut Bank Pub. Schs. v. Cut Bank Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d 482, 
488 (Mont. 2007) (holding that disclosure of redacted records does not violate FERPA). 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2002). Al-
though the precise reach of FERPA’s protections is critical to understanding the relation-
ship between FERPA and state open records laws, particularly because FERPA’s applicabil-
ity is notoriously confusing, a discussion of FERPA’s specific reach is beyond the scope of 
this Note. See generally Daggett, supra note 17 (providing an overview of FERPA and calling 
for Congress to amend FERPA to improve its effectiveness). 
110 See infra notes 116–154 and accompanying text. 
111 See infra notes 116–139 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 116–139 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 140–154 and accompanying text. 
114 See Daggett, supra note 17, at 97, 99; infra notes 140–154 and accompanying text. 
115 See infra notes 155–161 and accompanying text. 
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A. Decisions That Have Found No Conflict Because FERPA Is a Federal Law 
Whose Requirements Are Exempt from the State Open Records Law 
 Numerous state courts and one federal appeals court have con-
cluded that a university’s acceptance of federal funds renders the 
FERPA conditions on those funds binding, and therefore FERPA falls 
within the “otherwise prohibited” exemption to state open records 
laws.116 In 2002, in United States v. Miami University, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio Public Record Act’s 
“otherwise prohibited” exemption encompassed FERPA, in part be-
cause a university’s acceptance of federal funds renders the conditions 
on those funds legally binding.117 As a result, the court held that two 
universities did not need to disclose unredacted student disciplinary 
records because FERPA’s prohibition of disclosure of these records 
constituted a federal prohibition exempted under the state open re-
cords law.118 
 In Miami University, the Chronicle of Higher Education, a national news 
source, requested minimally redacted student disciplinary records from 
Miami University of Ohio and Ohio State University under the Ohio 
Public Records Act.119 Because of the Ohio Supreme Court’s prior in-
terpretation of the Act, Miami University believed that it was obligated 
to comply.120 Thus, pursuant to FERPA, the university contacted the 
Department to inform them of the university’s potential inability to 
comply with FERPA.121 The U.S. Department of Education (the “De-
partment”) responded that it believed that disciplinary records are cov-
                                                                                                                      
116 See, e.g., Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 811; Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind. News-
papers, Inc. v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. (Indiana Newspapers), 787 N.E.2d 893, 903–04 (Ind. 
App. 2003); Caledonian-Record Publ’g Co. v. Vt. State Coll., 833 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Vt. 
2003). A number of these cases cited a 1998 North Carolina appeals court case, DTH Pub-
lishing Corp. v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. See 496 S.E.2d 8, 12, 13 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1998) (concluding that information protected by FERPA falls within the “otherwise 
prohibited” exemption of the state open meetings law because, “[a]lthough FERPA does 
not require [the University] to do anything, but instead operates by withholding funds . . . 
FERPA does make student education records ‘privileged or confidential’ for [open meet-
ing law] purposes”). 
117 294 F.3d at 803, 809. 
118 See id. at 803. 
119 Id. at 804. 
120 See id. The University believed that this was the court’s view because in 1997, in State 
ex rel. Miami Student v. Miami University, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the same 
type of disciplinary records were not protected by FERPA and therefore could not be ex-
empt from disclosure under the “otherwise prohibited” exemption. See 680 N.E.2d 956, 
958, 959 (Ohio 1997). 
121 See Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 804. 
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ered by FERPA.122 Miami University nonetheless disclosed the records to 
the Chronicle, and upon learning of this disclosure, the United States, in 
part on behalf of the Department, filed a complaint in federal court 
seeking an injunction prohibiting both Miami University and Ohio State 
University from disclosing student disciplinary records to the Chroni-
cle.123 Despite granting the Chronicle’s motion to intervene, the district 
court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment and the 
injunction prohibiting the record’s release.124 
                                                                                                                     
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment 
that the proper interpretation of FERPA encompassed the disciplinary 
records at issue; it also implied that the state open record law’s “other-
wise prohibited” exemption should apply when FERPA protects the in-
formation.125 In conducting its analysis, the Sixth Circuit noted, “Spend-
ing clause legislation, when knowingly accepted by a fund recipient, 
imposes enforceable, affirmative obligations upon the states.”126 The 
court emphasized that compliance with FERPA’s conditions is manda-
tory if a university accepts federal education funds.127 Further, the court 
noted that the federal government may employ any available legal or 
equitable remedies to enforce the conditions as a “contractual” agree-
ment.128 The court thus affirmed the injunction prohibiting the univer-
sities from disclosing the information as an appropriate remedy for vio-
lating FERPA.129 
 Following Miami University, some state courts concluded that if a 
university has accepted federal funds, FERPA is a federal law that falls 
within the “otherwise prohibited” exemption to state open records 
laws.130 One court interpreted FERPA as threatening to rescind funding 
upon wrongful disclosure rather than prohibiting such disclosure, but it 
perceived this threat as sufficiently meaningful to consider FERPA a 
binding federal law.131 Others, like the Sixth Circuit in Miami University, 
concluded that if FERPA applies to the student information at issue, then 
 
122 See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. at 804–05. 
125 See id. at 809, 811, 813, 824. The court further noted that the district court did not 
need to defer to the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of FERPA because federal 
courts must defer to state court interpretations only of their own state laws. See id. at 811. 
126 Id. at 808. 
127 Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 808–09. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. at 819–20. 
130 See Indiana Newspapers, 787 N.E.2d at 903–04; Caledonian-Record, 833 A.2d at 1275. 
131 See Osborn v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 647 N.W.2d 158, 167–68 (Wis. 
2002). 
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the disclosure of that information is “otherwise prohibited” by federal 
law because FERPA is such a law.132 For example, one state court con-
cluded that a university need not disclose FERPA-protected information 
because the state open records law exempted such information from dis-
closure.133 Thus, the acceptance of federal funds makes FERPA’s prohi-
bitions binding and therefore makes them an exemption from state 
open records law disclosures.134 
 Although most courts do not reach the issue of whether FERPA 
preempts the state law because they determine that it fits within the 
“otherwise prohibited” exemption, one state court has concluded that 
FERPA is the type of federal law that preempts any conflicting state 
law.135 In 2002, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, 
in Rim of the World Unified School District v. Superior Court, held that 
FERPA preempted a portion of the California Education Code, a state 
law requiring disclosure of student expulsion records upon request.136 
The court noted that FERPA does not directly prohibit the disclosure of 
student information, but it does prohibit a university’s receipt of fed-
eral funds if the university discloses certain student information.137 The 
court thus concluded that there was “a genuine, undeniable conflict” 
between the state law requiring disclosure and FERPA,138 and therefore 
FERPA preempts the portion of the state law that required disclosure of 
student expulsion records.139 
B. Decisions That Have Found a Conflict Because FERPA Is  
a Contractual Condition, Not a Federal Law 
 In contrast, a number of courts have concluded that FERPA, as a 
condition on federal funding, is not a federal law affirmatively prohib-
iting disclosure, and that it therefore does not fall within the “other-
                                                                                                                      
132 See, e.g., Indiana Newspapers, 787 N.E.2d at 903–04, 909 (concluding that FERPA re-
quires confidentiality within its terms, and holding that documents pertaining to the firing 
of a university basketball coach should be released under the Indiana open records law as 
long as they are sufficiently redacted to comply with FERPA). 
133 See id. at 903–04. 
134 See Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 811; Indiana Newspapers, 787 N.E.2d at 903–04; Caledo-
nian-Record, 833 A.2d at 1275; Osborn, 647 N.W.2d at 167–68. 
135 See Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 12, 
15 (Ct. App. 2002); see Daggett, supra note 17, at 97. 
136 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12, 15. 
137 See id. at 14. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 15. 
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wise prohibited” exemption to state open records laws.140 These 
courts, explicitly or implicitly, have therefore required universities to 
disclose information pursuant to the state open records laws despite 
the universities’ potential obligation not to disclose that information 
under FERPA.141 
                                                                                                                     
 For example, in 1991, in Bauer v. Kincaid, the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri held that a university must disclose campus 
security reports to a student newspaper upon its request pursuant to 
the state open records law, despite a school policy preventing access to 
such reports by the media and the public.142 In response to the univer-
sity’s defense that it could not disclose the records because of FERPA, 
the court considered whether FERPA met the state open records law’s 
narrowly construed exemption for records “protected from disclosure 
by law.”143 It concluded that FERPA did not meet the exemption be-
cause FERPA “imposes a penalty” for disclosure but does not “prohibit” 
disclosure.144 Absent an express federal requirement, FERPA could not 
fall within the exemption, and therefore the university must disclose 
under the open records law.145 Similarly, in 2011 in Chicago Tribune Co. 
v. University of Illinois, the District Court for the Northern District of Il-
linois held that the state had the choice to accept federal funds and the 
FERPA conditions accompanying those funds, and therefore FERPA 
did not “specifically prohibit” disclosure of information whose disclo-
sure was required by the state open records law.146 
 
 
140 See, e.g., Chi. Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Ill., 781 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (N.D. Ill. 2011), 
argued, No. 11-2066 (7th Cir. Sept. 30, 2011); Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 587, 589 
(W.D. Mo. 1991). 
141 See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 676–77; Bauer, 759 F. Supp. at 594–95. 
142 See Bauer, 759 F. Supp. at 580, 587, 595. Although the court also held that FERPA 
did not protect the campus security reports, it indicated that, even if FERPA did apply, 
FERPA would not constitute an exemption to the open records law. See id. at 587, 594–95. 
143 Id. at 587. 
144 Id. at 587, 589. 
145 See id. at 587, 595; see also E. Conn. State Univ. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, No. CV 
960556097, 1996 WL 580966, at *1, *3–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 1996) (requiring re-
lease of FERPA-protected audio tape of a student disciplinary hearing to the professor who 
initiated the student complaint because it concluded that FERPA is “merely” a precondi-
tion for funding and not a prohibition on disclosure or state laws requiring disclosure). 
146 See Chicago Tribune, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 675, 677. A three-judge panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is currently considering this case on appeal and 
focusing in particular on whether FERPA compliance constitutes a “choice” for public 
universities and therefore does not fall under the “otherwise prohibited” exemption to the 
Illinois Freedom of Information Act. See generally Oral Argument, Chicago Tribune, 781 F. 
Supp. 2d 672 (No. 11-2066), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?d 
name=arg (enter case number “11-2006,” follow “list cases,” follow “11-2006,” follow “Oral 
Argument”) (inquiring as to who authorized the University of Illinois to accept the federal 
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 Other courts have not reached the issue of whether FERPA falls 
within the “otherwise prohibited” exemption because they have con-
cluded that FERPA does not apply to the student information at is-
sue.147 Nonetheless, at least one court has raised doubts that FERPA 
would fall within an “otherwise prohibited” exemption.148 In 1993 in 
Red & Black Publishing Co. v. Board of Regents, the Georgia Supreme 
Court concluded that the requested records and proceedings of a stu-
dent organization at the University of Georgia were not protected by 
FERPA and therefore must be disclosed under the Georgia Open Re-
cords Act.149 But the court also noted that even if FERPA did apply, a 
federal funding condition would not fall within the “otherwise prohib-
ited” exemption because it merely threatens to withdraw funds, and 
does not directly prohibit disclosure.150 
 Further, two courts have held that FERPA does not preempt state 
laws requiring disclosure.151 In the absence of an applicable state law 
exemption, these courts determined that there was no conflict between 
the state and federal laws and no indication that FERPA preempts state 
law otherwise; the courts thus held that the schools must follow the 
state law.152 For example, in 1994, in Princeton City School District, Board of 
Education v. Ohio State Board of Education, the Ohio Court of Appeals 
held that FERPA did not preempt a state statute requiring schools to 
provide student information to a state-wide data system because FERPA 
does not prohibit the release of information, it merely threatens the 
withdrawal of funds if such information is disclosed.153 Thus, the court 
saw no direct conflict between FERPA and the state data system’s disclo-
sure requirements.154 
                                                                                                                      
funds, and therefore bind itself to the funds’ conditions, and whether this person had the 
authority to displace state law in doing so). 
147 See, e.g., Red & Black Publ’g Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257, 261 (Ga. 1993); 
Kirwan v. Diamondback, 721 A.2d 196, 206, 261 (Md. 1998). 
148 See Red & Black, 427 S.E.2d at 261. 
149 Id. at 259, 262. 
150 See id. at 261. 
151 Maynard v. Greater Hoyt Sch. Dist. No. 61-4, 876 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (D.S.D. 1995); 
Princeton City Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio State Bd. of Educ., 645 N.E.2d 773, 778 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
152 See Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1108; Princeton City, 645 N.E.2d at 778. 
153 See Princeton City, 645 N.E.2d at 778. 
154 See id. (“[E]ven if [the state data system] did require schools to release information 
in violation of FERPA . . . it is still possible to comply with both. The [student] information 
would be released, and FERPA would cut off federal funds. FERPA, however, would not 
prevent the release of the [student] information.”). 
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C. Different Outcomes Stem from Different Readings of FERPA,  
Not of State Open Records Laws 
 Courts’ divergent approaches in reconciling FERPA and state open 
records laws seem to stem not from courts’ interpretations of the state 
open records laws, but from their interpretations of FERPA.155 The con-
sequences of these disparate approaches are significant.156 In states 
where FERPA is considered a contractual funding condition and not 
binding federal law, public universities are required to disclose student 
information under state law that they simultaneously are required not 
to disclose as a condition of their federal funding.157 As a result, these 
universities are left in the precarious position of having to decide be-
tween the lesser of two evils: comply with FERPA, and risk the penalties 
of noncompliance with the state open records law, or comply with the 
state open records law, and risk the penalties of noncompliance with 
FERPA.158 Meanwhile, public universities in states where courts under-
stand FERPA as an affirmative obligation face no conflict; universities 
need not disclose information protected by FERPA because the state 
open records law exempts such disclosures.159 Thus, these disparate 
approaches mean that any intentions of national uniformity for student 
privacy through FERPA are frustrated not by the differences in state 
open records laws, but by the differences in courts’ understandings of 
FERPA.160 Judicial interpretations of FERPA as a contractual condition 
                                                                                                                      
155 See Baker, supra note 14, at 299–300 (describing various ways in which courts have 
limited FERPA’s scope to resolve conflicts with state open records laws). Courts that con-
clude that FERPA is not a prohibition tend to take seriously their obligation to construe 
state open records laws liberally and their exemptions narrowly. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, 
781 F. Supp. 2d at 676–77; Bauer, 759 F. Supp. at 587. As a result, they construe FERPA to 
be outside the narrow bounds of the “otherwise prohibited” exemption. See, e.g., Chicago 
Tribune, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 676–77; Bauer, 759 F. Supp. at 587. In contrast, courts reaching 
the conclusion that FERPA is a prohibition tend to look carefully at the intent and purpose 
of FERPA and state open records laws, and recognize the consequences of disclosure: the 
threat of a withdrawal of federal funds and the compromising of students’ privacy. See, e.g., 
Indiana Newspapers, 787 N.E.2d at 903–04. 
156 See Baker, supra note 14, at 283, 311–12. 
157 See id. at 283 (noting that narrow judicial interpretations of FERPA place public 
universities “between the proverbial rock and a hard place”); Daggett, supra note 17, at 99. 
158 See Baker, supra note 14, at 283, 311–12 (referring to this situation as “dual liabil-
ity”). When presented with this “choice,” universities are incentivized to manipulate or 
ignore FERPA. See Salzwedel & Ericson, supra note 12, at 1097. Despite threatening severe 
sanctions, FERPA’s ultimate penalty is too drastic to be a realistic threat. See Lynn M. Dag-
gett, Bucking Up Buckley II: Using Civil Rights Claims to Enforce the Federal Student Records Stat-
ute, 21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 29, 57 (1997). 
159 See Daggett, supra note 17, at 97. 
160 See id. 
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and not a federal law thus put public universities in a precarious posi-
tion.161 
III. Valid Conditional Funding Statutes Have the Power to 
Trump and Displace Contrary State Law 
 At the heart of the judicial divide in reconciling FERPA with state 
open records laws is whether FERPA, as a federal conditional funding 
statute, has the force of law such that it may displace contrary state law 
under the Supremacy Clause.162 If it does, then when FERPA and state 
open records laws conflict and there is no exemption to resolve the 
conflict, the Supremacy Clause can step in to determine the relation-
ship.163 If it does not, then FERPA represents contractual terms be-
tween the federal government and the federal fund recipient and does 
not without more trump or displace contrary state law.164 
 Section A introduces the Supremacy Clause and demonstrates that 
it applies to valid conditional funding statutes.165 Section B outlines the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which assesses the validity of con-
ditional funding statutes, and demonstrates that conditional funding 
statutes must meet a low bar to be found constitutional.166 This Part 
concludes that as long as FERPA meets this low bar, it is capable of 
trumping or displacing contrary state open records laws via the Su-
premacy Clause.167 
A. The Supremacy Clause Applies to Valid Conditional Funding Statutes 
 The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that valid 
exercises of congressional power trump state and local laws.168 Su-
premacy thus dictates the outcome when state and federal laws directly 
conflict.169 Through supremacy, state laws are automatically displaced 
                                                                                                                      
161 See Baker, supra note 14, at 311–14. 
162 See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 
746 (2008). 
163 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause dictates the relationship be-
tween federal and state laws when a direct conflict arises between them. See Merrill, supra 
note 162, at 746. 
164 See Engdahl, supra note 14, at 530, 532. 
165 See infra notes 168–176 and accompanying text. 
166 See infra notes 177–227 and accompanying text. 
167 See infra notes 224–227 and accompanying text. 
168 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance [of the Constitution] . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”). 
169 Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 39, 41 
(2005); Merrill, supra note 162, at 731, 746. 
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to the extent that they conflict with federal law.170 For the Supremacy 
Clause to apply, the federal law must be pursuant to a valid exercise of 
Congress’s enumerated powers.171 Thus, if a federal government action 
has “the force and effect of binding federal law,” it carries the possibil-
ity of trumping or displacing state law.172 
 The Supremacy Clause should apply to valid federal conditional 
funding statutes because Congress’s enumerated powers include the 
power to spend for the general welfare, and Congress has authority to 
attach conditions to this spending.173 Further, the Supreme Court has 
implied that the Supremacy Clause applies to such statutes and their 
implementing regulations.174 For example, in a number of cases review-
ing state implementation of the Aid for Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) program, a conditional funding component of the Social 
Security Act, the Supreme Court held that the state law or regulation at 
issue was invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it conflicted with 
the federal statute delineating the terms of AFDC, whose funds and 
accompanying conditions the states had accepted.175 Despite some dis-
sent to this proposition, a number of scholars have affirmed that the 
Supremacy Clause applies to conditional funding statutes, noting in 
particular that the choice inherent in whether to be bound by a condi-
tional funding statute does not make such statutes any less valid as fed-
eral laws.176 
                                                                                                                      
 
170 See Gardbaum, supra note 169, at 40, 62 (noting that the Supremacy Clause requires 
“irreconcilability between state and federal laws and not mere interference or inconven-
ience”). Congress may also establish a relationship between federal and state law, and 
thereby between federal and state power, through preemption. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Waste Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). Through preemption, a federal law may dis-
place a state law even if the two laws do not directly conflict. See id. Some scholars have 
noted that preemption and supremacy are often conflated but are in theory distinct 
mechanisms. See Gardbaum, supra note 169, at 41; Merrill, supra note 162, at 730–31. 
171 See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988) (indicating that the Supremacy 
Clause applies to any actions of the federal government pursuant to its constitutional au-
thority, including in implementing regulations); Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as 
a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 91, 99 (2003) (emphasizing that the 
Supremacy Clause applies only to valid actions pursuant to enumerated powers). 
172 See Merrill, supra note 162, at 762–63. 
173 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
174 See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 133, 145–46 (1982); Townsend v. Swank, 404 
U.S. 282, 284, 285 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311, 316, 333 (1968). 
175 See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 133, 145–46; Townsend, 404 U.S. at 284, 285; King, 392 
U.S. at 311, 316, 333. 
176 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 Duke L.J. 
345, 392 (2008); Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative Means of Court 
Access for Safety Net Statutes, 10 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 27, 77, 78 (2008); David Sloss, Constitu-
tional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 355, 426 (2004). At least one scholar 
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B. What Constitutes a Valid Conditional Funding Statute: The Minimal 
Restrictions of South Dakota v. Dole 
 The central question for conditional funding statutes, then, is not 
whether the Supremacy Clause can apply to them, because the Su-
preme Court has indicated that it can, but whether a statute has been 
validly enacted such that the Supremacy Clause does apply.177 There-
fore, before using the Supremacy Clause to displace state law, courts 
must assess whether the conditional funding statute that purportedly 
conflicts with a state law is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to spend 
and place conditions on funds.178 
1. The Constitutionality of Conditions on Funds 
 Congress’s power to enact conditional funding statutes stems from 
its power to tax and spend.179 Congress may attach conditions to money 
it provides as aid to states and other entities.180 Although some states 
have challenged this power as a violation of the Tenth Amendment or 
as otherwise overextending Congress’s power, the Supreme Court has 
held that Congress may use funding conditions to achieve policy goals 
even in areas in which Congress may lack the power to regulate di-
rectly.181 This is because states and other entities may choose to accept 
federal funds, and therefore they may choose whether to be bound by 
                                                                                                                      
has implied that the Supremacy Clause does not apply to conditional funding statutes be-
cause the choice to accept the conditions makes such statutes more akin to contracts than 
binding “law.” See Engdahl, supra note 14, at 498, 534. This contract theory builds on the 
Supreme Court’s analogy of conditional funding statutes to a contractual offer. See Penn-
hurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). According to this view, 
Spending Clause legislation is “extraneous” congressional regulation beyond Congress’s 
enumerated powers. Engdahl, supra note 14, at 530, 534. Numerous scholars, however, 
have challenged the contract theory’s logic and propriety. See Bagenstos, supra, at 390–91 
(criticizing contract theorists for extending the metaphor too far); Brian D. Galle, Getting 
Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of 
Federal Funds, 37 Conn. L. Rev. 155, 170 (2004) (arguing that the contract theory’s logic 
actually leads to the conclusion that conditional funding statutes related to advancing the 
general welfare are necessary and proper and are therefore “law” pursuant to an enumer-
ated power regardless of whether they are also contractual); Sloss, supra, at 424–25 (noting 
that Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who seem to support the contract the-
ory, do not accept Professor Engdahl’s proposition that conditional funding statutes are 
different from other federal laws). 
177 See Clark, supra note 171, at 99, 101. 
178 See id. at 100, 101. 
179 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
180 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. 
181 See id. at 206–07; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). 
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the conditions on those funds.182 As a result, Congress often uses its 
spending power in areas of traditional state concern, such as welfare 
and education.183 Through conditions on these funds, the federal gov-
ernment is able to promote certain behaviors or minimum standards 
nationwide, to the extent that states accept the funds and accompany-
ing conditions.184 
2. Minimal Limits on Funding Conditions: The Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine 
 Although Congress’s power to spend and to attach conditions to 
spending is broad, the Supreme Court has placed some limitations up-
on this power.185 In 1987, in South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court 
summarized these restrictions.186 First, Congress’s use of the spending 
power must be for the “general welfare.”187 Second, conditions on the 
receipt of funds must be expressly stated and unambiguous, such that 
the states can voluntarily and knowingly accept those conditions.188 
Third, the conditions must have a “nexus” to the particular federal in-
terest or concern of the spending.189 Fourth, conditions or funding 
grants may not be otherwise barred by another constitutional provi-
sion.190 Fifth, the “financial inducement offered by Congress [may not] 
be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into com-
pulsion.’”191 After considering these restrictions, the Dole Court held 
that a condition imposing a national minimum age for purchasing al-
cohol in return for receipt of federal highway grants was a constitu-
tional use of Congress’s power.192 It reached this conclusion despite the 
                                                                                                                      
182 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
183 See Lainie Rutkow et al., Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu La-
beling Laws and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 772, 777 
(2008). 
184 See Baker, supra note 14, at 297 n.57; Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The 
Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 141, 203 (2002). 
185 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206–07, 211; Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 n.13. 
186 See 483 U.S. at 206. 
187 Id. at 207. 
188 Id.; Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
189 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08; Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); 
Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 355. 
190 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
191 Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). Some 
scholars view the coercion element as part of the fourth limitation. See Lynn A. Baker & 
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, 
and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 Ind. L.J. 459, 526 n.326 (2002); 
Galle, supra note 176, at 161 & n.44. 
192 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. 
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attenuated nexus between a minimum drinking age and highway im-
provements, and despite Congress’s lack of power to regulate alcohol 
purchasing directly because it is an area reserved to the states by the 
Twenty-first Amendment.193 
 Dole and subsequent cases employing it have evinced a broad un-
derstanding of Congress’s power to condition funds, only narrowly lim-
ited by the restrictions set out in Dole’s unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine.194 On the first restriction, the Court has left the definition of 
general welfare to Congress.195 As such, the general welfare restriction 
is practically meaningless.196 Similarly, the Court has interpreted the 
third restriction, requiring a relationship to the federal interest under-
lying the spending and often referred to as the “nexus” or “germane-
ness” restriction, as more of a guideline than a meaningful limita-
tion.197 Further, although intended to prevent the federal government 
from overreaching, the nexus restriction, like the general welfare re-
quirement, is likely to remain meaningless because of the nebulous na-
ture of a nexus.198 
                                                                                                                     
 The Court has also interpreted narrowly the fourth restriction, the 
constitutional limitation on Congress’s conditioning power, by exclud-
ing the Tenth Amendment as a bar to congressional spending condi-
tions.199 In Dole, the Court indicated an express limitation that Con-
gress may not use its spending power as an incitement for otherwise 
unconstitutional behavior by the states.200 But aside from restricting 
Congress from inducing unconstitutional behavior, other constitutional 
provisions do not place meaningful limits on Congress’s ability to con-
 
193 See U.S. Const. amend. XXI; Dole, 483 U.S. at 205–06. The federal statute setting a 
minimum alcohol purchasing age of twenty-one purportedly advanced a national policy 
objective of promoting safe highways free of drunk drivers. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
194 See Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 355; Baker & Berman, supra note 191, at 464. 
195 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41, 645 (1937). 
196 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 n.2, 208; Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 356, 359. 
197 See Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 365, 367. The Dole Court suggested that this unde-
veloped restriction may not be a strict requirement and declined to clarify the strength of 
the relationship required. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08 & n.3. Instead, the Court concluded 
that there was a sufficient nexus between setting a minimum drinking age and spending 
for highway improvements. See id. at 208. In her Dole dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
emphasized the importance of this requirement in keeping Congress’s spending power 
within its appropriate scope. See id. at 217–18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
198 See Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 367–69. 
199 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209, 210; Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 
(1947). 
200 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. 
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dition the receipt of federal funds.201 For example, the Dole Court 
noted that the Tenth Amendment “did not concomitantly limit the 
range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.”202 This is 
because states retain the power to choose whether to accept federal 
funds.203 Thus, funding conditions may regulate in spheres that are 
traditionally areas of state concern without raising Tenth Amendment 
concerns, because the conditional nature of the funds allows states the 
option of forfeiting certain regulatory powers in exchange for fund-
ing.204 As long as the condition is not unconstitutional in and of itself, 
Congress can use conditions to regulate behavior in ways that it other-
wise could not directly.205 
                                                                                                                     
 Further, courts have interpreted the fifth limitation of no coercion 
narrowly, rejecting states’ assertions that the amount of money accom-
panying certain conditional funding statutes is so significant as to shift 
from incentivizing to impermissibly coercing states.206 The coercion 
limitation could meaningfully enforce Tenth Amendment boundaries 
by preventing Congress from infringing on states’ autonomy; a federal 
funding offer so appealing that the states are essentially forced to ac-
cept the funds and the accompanying conditions would go too far.207 
But courts have not found the allure of funding so coercive that such 
 
201 Id. at 209, 210 (suggesting that “the constitutional limitations on Congress when 
exercising its spending power are less exacting than those on its authority to regulate di-
rectly”). 
202 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210; see Zeitlow, supra note 184, at 167 (noting this lack of “state 
sovereignty-based limits” to the spending power). 
203 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210; Steward, 301 U.S. at 595. 
204 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210–11; West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
289 F.3d 281, 295 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional 
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58, 59 (2006) (emphasizing that universities may choose whether 
to accept federal funds, and holding that the Solomon Amendment is an acceptable exer-
cise of the congressional spending power); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 
(1984) (stating that universities have a choice in whether to accept federal funds and the 
accompanying conditions, and holding that a university is free to deny federal funds in 
order to avoid having to comply with Title IX). 
205 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. 
206 See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; Steward, 301 U.S. at 590; West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 288–
91; Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000); California v. United 
States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997). 
207 See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining coercion as 
“leav[ing] the state with no practical alternative but to comply with federal restrictions”); 
Galle, supra note 176, at 161 & n.44. Although many courts have shied away from further 
defining and unpacking the coercion theory and have thus not found coercion, the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have recognized the value of the coercion theory and at-
tempted to apply it meaningfully. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1262, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2011), partial cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 604 (2011); West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 288–91, 294. 
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statutes overstep the line of encouragement into unconstitutional coer-
cion.208 For example, in Dole, the Court determined that the percent-
age of federal highway funds the state would forgo if it chose not to 
comply with the conditions was not significant enough to constitute 
coercion.209 Instead, the Court concluded that congressional “encour-
agement” of state compliance with a national policy through condition-
ing receipt of funds “is a valid use of the spending power.”210 Neither 
the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have subsequently found any 
conditional funding statute so coercive as to be invalid.211 Further, a 
number of scholars suggest that the coercion argument will remain 
unpersuasive, even when it seems that states have no choice but to ac-
cept the funds, because the line between encouragement and coercion 
is too vague for courts to navigate.212 
                                                                                                                     
 Of the Dole restrictions, the second “unambiguous, for voluntary 
and knowing acceptance” requirement has seen the greatest utilization 
by courts and scholars as a meaningful restriction on funding condi-
tions.213 The clear notice or clear statement rule, which has developed 
as an offshoot of this restriction, requires transparent communication 
of the conditions on funds in order for a conditional funding statute to 
be valid.214 The rule builds on the contract metaphor of voluntary and 
knowing acceptance of a contract’s terms.215 Under this doctrine, “the 
Court refuses to recognize any duty burdening a state unless, in the 
Court’s view, the language of the statute clearly requires it.”216 Accord-
ingly, states must clearly understand what is expected of them by ac-
 
208 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1201–02; California, 104 F.3d at 1092. 
209 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12. 
210 Id. 
211 See Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 372 (noting that only one court has come close to 
finding coercion—the Fourth Circuit, in 1997, in Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, 
106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1412 
(2006). 
212 See Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 372–74, 376 (suggesting that the coercion theory 
will not take hold because any federal spending on states is a gift, not an entitlement); 
Baker & Berman, supra note 191, at 467–69; see also Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Deci-
sions, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 875, 882, 930 (2008) (arguing that there is no empirical proof that 
states need the money so significantly that conditional funding is coercive). 
213 See Galle, supra note 176, at 162; Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme 
Court and the Clear Statement Rule for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 1067, 1069–
70 (2010). 
214 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006); 
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Seligmann, supra note 213, at 1069–70. 
215 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 24–25; Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 393–94. 
216 Galle, supra note 176, at 157. 
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cepting funds in order to make an informed choice.217 Thus, due to 
more extensive development of this concept by courts and scholars, the 
requirement of voluntary and knowing acceptance, through clear no-
tice of funding terms, appears to operate as the most likely restriction 
on federal funding conditions.218 
 Some scholars are troubled by the limited restrictions Dole and the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine place on conditional funding 
statutes and have called for more meaningful judicial enforcement of 
restraints on conditional spending.219 In particular, they argue that Dole 
and the existing unconstitutional conditions doctrine do not suffi-
ciently prevent Congress from infringing on states’ rights to regulate 
and act autonomously.220 But at least one scholar has suggested that the 
political process, coupled with state officials’ capacity to consider feder-
alism values in decision making, sufficiently enforces Congress’s 
boundaries, and that therefore greater development and enforcement 
of the Dole criteria are unnecessary.221 Further, proponents of the exist-
ing unconstitutional conditions doctrine believe that newer develop-
ments, like the clear statement rule, have made significant progress in 
ensuring notice and consent.222 From this perspective, even if Dole’s 
current interpretation places few restrictions on conditional funding 
                                                                                                                      
217 See Zeitlow, supra note 184, at 205. One scholar has criticized the clear statement 
rule for promoting an assumption that state actors are not capable of making informed 
and appropriate decisions that reflect federalism values. See Galle, supra note 212, at 934–
35. Further, as uncertainty is an element in any contract or bargain, if the contract meta-
phor is applied to conditional funding statutes, such uncertainty should be permitted. See 
Galle, supra note 176, at 175. 
218 See Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the 
Dole Loopholes, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 163, 167 (2001); Seligmann, supra note 213, at 1071. 
219 See Baker, supra note 25, at 106 (proposing a presumption of invalidity for condi-
tions that could not be enacted validly under another of Congress’s powers, rebuttable 
only by a showing that spending is for reimbursement, not regulation); Baker & Berman, 
supra note 191, at 470, 521 (calling for a reinvigoration of the coercion and relatedness 
restrictions); see also Cedar Rapids Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 84 (1998) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Dole Court’s unwillingness to restrict the 
spending power and the conditions that flow from it, and writing that “[w]e must interpret 
Spending Clause legislation narrowly, in order to avoid saddling the States with obligations 
that they did not anticipate”). 
220 See Baker, supra note 25, at 106–07, 111 (criticizing Dole for misaligning the balance 
of power by disregarding the Tenth Amendment and for making the incorrect assumption 
that states have a choice in whether to accept federal funds); Merrill, supra note 162, at 
749 (noting that states must be sufficiently represented in decisions to displace state law 
through conditional funding statutes). 
221 See Galle, supra note 212, at 880–81, 882; Galle, supra note 176, at 159, 229–30; see 
also Zeitlow, supra note 184, at 205 (suggesting that existing criteria are sufficient to pro-
tect state sovereignty because they require acknowledgment of state policy implications). 
222 See Seligmann, supra note 213, at 1114–15. 
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statutes, the test has the capacity to impose greater limits if courts chose 
to use it as such.223 
 In sum, as the Supreme Court has concluded that the Supremacy 
Clause applies to valid conditional funding statutes such that they can 
displace contrary state law, the key analytical question is whether a 
conditional funding statute is a valid use of the spending power.224 Un-
der the unconstitutional conditions doctrine stemming from Dole, most 
(if not all) conditional funding statutes withstand judicial scrutiny.225 
But despite some criticisms of this low bar, Dole remains the analytical 
tool with which courts assess the validity of conditional funding stat-
utes.226 Thus, for a conditional funding statute to trump or displace a 
contrary state law, it must pass muster under Dole.227 
IV. How FERPA Measures Up: Assessing FERPA’s Validity Under 
Dole and Its Capacity to Trump Contrary State Law 
 If FERPA meets the low bar set in 1987 by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in South Dakota v. Dole for a valid conditional funding statute, then the 
Supremacy Clause must guide the outcome when FERPA conflicts with 
a state open records law.228 This Part applies the Dole analysis to FERPA 
by offering a preliminary assessment of areas in which FERPA may raise 
concerns given the limitations imposed by Dole and the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine.229 Section A shows that FERPA easily meets 
three of Dole’s requirements.230 Section B addresses the coercion ques-
tion, concluding that FERPA does not coerce participation, despite at-
                                                                                                                      
223 See Zeitlow, supra note 184, at 182. 
224 See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
225 See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1197, 1209 (2004); Galle, supra note 176, at 162; cf. Nicole Liguori, Note, Leaving No 
Child Behind (Except in States That Don’t Do as We Say): Connecticut’s Challenge to the Federal 
Government’s Power to Control State Education Policy Through the Spending Clause, 47 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1033, 1069–70 (2006) (arguing that the No Child Left Behind Act unconstitutionally 
intrudes on an area traditionally of state concern and dilutes diversity in education policy, 
but noting that under the current unconstitutional conditions doctrine it would pass mus-
ter). 
226 See Florida, 648 F.3d at 1262–67 (using Dole to conclude that the Medicaid expansion 
portion of the Affordable Healthcare Act is a valid congressional action, in part because it 
does not coerce state participation); Siegel, supra note 14, at 166–67 (noting that the Su-
preme Court has had opportunities to revise the Dole jurisprudence but has not done so). 
227 See generally Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (outlining the Dole factors). 
228 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–08 (1987); Baker & Berman, supra note 
191, at 460; Clark, supra note 171, at 92. 
229 See infra notes 234–285 and accompanying text. 
230 See infra notes 234–245 and accompanying text. 
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taching a significant revenue stream to its conditions.231 Finally, Section 
C raises questions about the states’ voluntary and knowing acceptance 
of FERPA’s conditions.232 This Part concludes that, under the current 
conditional spending jurisprudence, FERPA survives constitutional 
scrutiny.233 
A. General Welfare, Relatedness, and No Constitutional Bar Otherwise 
 FERPA clearly survives three of the Dole criteria.234 Although 
FERPA itself does not provide any funding or grants, its conditions ac-
company any education spending by the U.S. Department of Education 
(the “Department”) authorized by Congress, including student finan-
cial aid, such as Pell Grants and Perkins Loans, and grants through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the Higher Education Op-
portunity Act, and other funding programs.235 These programs serve 
the general welfare by facilitating the production of an educated, capa-
ble workforce, and by providing opportunities for individuals of all 
means to obtain higher education.236 FERPA thus fulfills the first Dole 
requirement because the spending to which the FERPA conditions ap-
ply is for the general welfare.237 
                                                                                                                      
231 See infra notes 246–255 and accompanying text. 
232 See infra notes 256–285 and accompanying text. 
233 See infra notes 283–285 and accompanying text. 
234 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Dole, 483 U.S. at 206–08. 
235 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (indicating that “[n]o funds shall be made available” 
through any of the Department’s spending programs if FERPA’s terms are not met); cf. 
Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984) (holding that if any student at a uni-
versity receives federal funds to attend, the university must comply with Title IX). See gener-
ally U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Fiscal Year 2013 Budget, http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/ 
budget/budget13/summary/13summary.pdf (last visited May 14, 2012) [hereinafter 2013 
Budget] (providing an overview of projected spending and discretionary grants by the 
Department). 
236 See Research Universities, supra note 15, at 5. Congress has spent for higher edu-
cation purposes since the 1800s. See Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 723. Further, courts 
give significant deference to Congress’s definition of general welfare, suggesting that an 
education spending program will pass muster as long as Congress believes it is spending 
for the general welfare. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Bradley, supra note 13, at 12–13. 
237 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. Despite judicial deference to Congress’s definition of the 
general welfare, some scholars suggest that an education spending program may not meet 
the “general welfare” requirement, because the benefits of such spending are too local-
ized. See Bagenstos, supra note 176, at 359; John C. Eastman, Is the Solomon Amendment 
“F.A.I.R.”? Some Thoughts on Congress’s Power to Impose This Condition on Federal Spending, 50 
Vill. L. Rev. 1171, 1178–79 (2005). 
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 FERPA also meets the minimal nexus or relatedness Dole require-
ment.238 FERPA’s conditions are intended “to protect . . . individuals’ 
right to privacy” in educational settings.239 Through its spending pro-
grams, Congress provides significant financial resources to higher edu-
cation institutions, and FERPA imposes the caveat that those institu-
tions must maintain baseline privacy protections for the students they 
serve.240 This is particularly important because higher education insti-
tutions collect extensive information about students.241 As FERPA’s pri-
vacy protections bear a rational relationship to spending for higher ed-
ucation, at least as much as a minimum drinking age bears to spending 
for highway improvements, FERPA survives the third Dole require-
ment.242 
 Additionally, FERPA meets Dole’s fourth requirement, which pro-
hibits conditions that require unconstitutional behavior.243 Instituting 
privacy protections is not otherwise unconstitutional; in fact, federal 
and state governments regulate privacy through many other means.244 
Further, given that Dole dismissed the Tenth Amendment as a limitation 
on congressional power to condition funds, FERPA’s regulation of pri-
vacy in the education sector, which is an area traditionally of state con-
cern, does not appear to be a bar to FERPA’s conditions.245 
B. Absence of Coercion 
 The significant amount of federal funding tied to FERPA raises 
questions about whether FERPA leaves states and universities no choice 
but to accept the funds, in violation of Dole’s fifth coercion restric-
tion.246 Scholars and practitioners have characterized universities’ need 
                                                                                                                      
 
238 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 167 (1992). 
239 Joint Statement, supra note 53, at 39,862. 
240 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); 2013 Budget, supra note 235, at 2. 
241 See Daggett, supra note 17, at 75. 
242 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 209; cf. Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at 
Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 Harv. J.L. 
& Pub. Pol’y 501, 596 (2005) (analyzing the relatedness question for the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), another conditional funding statute). 
243 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
244 See Raul, supra note 94, at 19–20; Stuart, supra note 85, at 364; cf. Rumsfeld v. Fo-
rum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59–60 (2006) (upholding the 
Solomon Amendment, and noting that “a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if 
it could be constitutionally imposed directly”). 
245 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. 
246 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 722–23. In fiscal year 2007, 
the federal government overall provided more than $69.7 billion to higher education insti-
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for federal funds as so critical that in practice universities must accept 
whatever conditions Congress attaches to them.247 Despite this weighty 
reliance, the coercion restriction as courts currently interpret it is very 
unlikely to lead to a finding that FERPA, or any conditional funding 
statute, is unconstitutional:248 “[E]ven where the scope of the federal 
grant at issue may make the State’s voluntary decision not to accept the 
funds ‘an unrealistic option,’ compliance with the conditions placed on 
the federal funds ‘is the price a federally funded [entity] must pay.’”249 
Thus, a conditional funding statute can be politically coercive, but not 
so coercive as a legal matter to violate Dole, because the state retains the 
option not to accept.250 Even if noncompliance results in complete 
                                                                                                                      
tutions. Jenna Ashley Robinson & John Eick, The Academic-Governmental Complex, The John 
William Pope Center for Higher Educ. Pol’y (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.popecenter. 
org/commentaries/article.html?id-2320. Of these funds, approximately $30.5 billion came 
from the Department. Id. In 2013, the Department aims to spend $36.1 billion on Pell 
Grants alone, $128.9 billion in low-interest student loans and other student aid programs, 
and $3.2 billion for specific higher education initiatives from President Obama. See 2013 
Budget, supra note 235, at 44, 54. In 2007–2008, twelve percent of the University of Cali-
fornia system’s operating budget came from federal appropriations, and eight percent 
came from student fees, much of which is paid for by federal loans and grants to students. 
See Legislative Analyst’s Office, A Primer: Funding Higher Education 32, 34 (2005) 
[hereinafter Primer], available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/fund_highred/062905_ 
fundng_highred.pdf; Univ. of Cal. Office of the President, The UC Budget: Myths 
and Facts 1 (2009), available at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/budgetmyths 
.pdf. In 2011, at the University of Illinois, federal financial aid covered approximately sixty-
three percent of students’ tuition and fee payments, and other federal funds constituted 
approximately nineteen percent of the university’s total operating revenue. Ill. Appellant 
Brief, supra note 11, at 8. 
247 See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 143; Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 722–23. 
248 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12. This is because no court has found coercion thus far. See 
West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 289 (4th Cir. 2002). Fur-
ther, despite the federal government’s sizeable contributions to universities’ operating budg-
ets, public universities also receive significant funds from the state. See Research Universi-
ties, supra note 15, at 15. 
249 See Gaubatz, supra note 242, at 597 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cnty. Schs. v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 241 (1990)). 
250 Cf. Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Educational Federalism, 56 Emory L.J. 125, 
128, 156 (2006) (discussing the No Child Left Behind Act as politically coercive). In 1989 
in Nevada v. Skinner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described why the 
coercion element is more of a political question than a judicial question: 
[C]an a sovereign state which is always free to increase its tax revenues ever 
be coerced by the withholding of federal funds—or is the state merely pre-
sented with hard political choices? The difficulty if not the impropriety of 
making judicial judgments regarding a state’s financial capabilities renders 
the coercion theory highly suspect as a method for resolving disputes be-
tween federal and state governments. 
884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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withdrawal of federal funds and subsequent political challenges, a con-
ditional funding statute still will not be considered coercive.251 If a state 
disagreed strongly enough with FERPA, it could compensate for the 
loss of federal funding on its own.252 
 When considered in this light, FERPA appears just as acceptable as 
any other federal funding statute.253 Congress recognized a need for 
student privacy protections and decided to encourage such protections 
by conditioning the receipt of federal education dollars on compliance 
with a baseline privacy standard.254 Thus, despite the seemingly manda-
tory reliance by universities on federal funds, FERPA is not unconstitu-
tionally coercive.255 
C. Voluntary and Knowing Acceptance of Unambiguous Conditions 
 Dole’s second restriction, voluntary and knowing acceptance of 
funding conditions through clear notice of the obligations, raises more 
significant questions about FERPA’s validity.256 Although FERPA’s terms 
are sufficiently unambiguous to pass muster under this requirement, the 
processes by which federal fund recipients actually accept funds and the 
accompanying conditions may not embody the consent envisioned by 
this Dole requirement.257 
 The plain language of FERPA conditions funds on universities re-
fraining from having a policy or practice that permits the disclosure of 
personally identifiable information from student records.258 Thus, 
FERPA’s terms are unambiguous because “a participant who accepts 
federal education funds is well aware of the conditions imposed by . . . 
                                                                                                                      
251 Cf. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a federal conditional funding statute, in Arkansas, despite 
the fact that federal education funds constituted twelve percent of the state’s K–12 educa-
tion budget, because although forgoing the funds “would be politically painful,” the state 
still had a choice in whether to accept them). 
252 Cf. David W. Breneman, Ass’n of Governing Bds. of Univs. & Colls., Are the 
States and Public Higher Education Striking a New Bargain? 7–11 (2004) (describ-
ing creative solutions for increasing state funding of public colleges and universities). 
253 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006 & Supp. 2010); cf. Gaubatz, supra note 242, at 598 
(concluding that RLUIPA is not coercive). 
254 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); Joint Statement, supra note 53, at 39,862; Kaplin & Lee, 
supra note 13, at 722–23. 
255 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 241; Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; cf. Heise, supra 
note 250, at 128, 158 (arguing that the No Child Left Behind Act is not unconstitutionally 
coercive). 
256 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; infra notes 263–282 and accompanying text. 
257 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; infra notes 258–282 and accompanying text. 
258 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b). 
1080 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1045 
FERPA and is clearly able to ascertain what is expected of it.”259 At least 
one scholar argues that even if FERPA’s general requirement is clear, 
the scope of FERPA’s prohibitions and the meaning of particular terms 
within it are too ambiguous.260 But another scholar has suggested that 
agency adjustments to a statute’s implementing regulations do not ren-
der it unclear by default.261 As a result, any ambiguity in the details of 
FERPA’s application is likely insufficient to argue that the state cannot 
make an informed choice regarding whether to accept the funds and 
their conditions.262 
 The question of meaningful consent to the conditions, however, 
raises more significant questions about FERPA’s validity in accordance 
with the Dole requirements.263 Although FERPA puts forth unambigu-
ous conditions for states to accept voluntarily, the unit of the state do-
ing the consenting may not reflect the level of consent contemplated by 
the Dole requirement.264 Dole seems to envision high-level state officials 
in the executive or legislative branches making a conscious decision to 
accept federal funds and their conditions.265 From this perspective, 
elected or at least politically accountable state officials voluntarily and 
knowingly accept both the conditions themselves and the impact they 
have on state statutory schemes.266 These officials then also bear the 
consequence of a breakdown in legislative policy or voter dissatisfaction 
when state laws, such as open records laws, are displaced by contrary 
federal requirements.267 The clear notice requirement thus enables 
                                                                                                                      
 
259 United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 809 (6th Cir. 2002); cf. Rumsfeld, 547 
U.S. at 58, 59 (upholding the Solomon Amendment, a similarly worded conditional fund-
ing statute, in part implicitly because its conditions were unambiguous). 
260 See Daggett, supra note 17, at 92. 
261 See Engstrom, supra note 225, at 1218. 
262 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. Further, one scholar has suggested that conditional 
funding statutes like FERPA that prohibit certain actions may survive with greater ambigu-
ity than conditional funding statutes that require states to create compliant programs. See 
Engstrom, supra note 225, at 1206, 1240 (suggesting that greater deference is owed to 
agencies for statutes that prohibit behavior rather than require program creation). 
263 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24, 25 (1981); infra 
notes 264–282 and accompanying text. 
264 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 
813, 822–23, 826–27 (1998). 
265 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 39 
(2011). 
266 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; Engstrom, supra note 225, at 1218; Zeitlow, supra note 
184, at 202–04. 
267 See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (noting that the state represents its residents’ desires in 
accepting or rejecting federal funds, and that “[i]f a State’s citizens view federal policy as 
sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant” through 
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voters to know whether to place blame for an undesired result on the 
federal government, for being unclear, or on the state, for accepting 
terms its voters dislike.268 
 FERPA complicates the consent question because its structure does 
not necessarily require active consent by a politically accountable state 
official.269 Some conditional funding statutes, like the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001, require state legislatures to implement compliant 
programs in exchange for funds.270 In these situations, the executive 
and legislative branches are aware of their obligations because they are 
actively implementing programs.271 In contrast, conditional funding 
statutes like FERPA prohibit certain behaviors on the part of universi-
ties as fund recipients.272 As such, FERPA does not necessarily require 
any program creation or legislative action.273 As a result, it is possible 
                                                                                                                      
the legislature); Dennis Murashko, Comment, Accountability and Constitutional Federalism: 
Reconsidering Federal Conditional Spending Programs in Light of Democratic Political Theory, 101 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 931, 933–34, 939 (2007) (defining political accountability). 
268 See Engstrom, supra note 225, at 1281; Murashko, supra note 267, at 933–34. 
269 Cf. Engstrom, supra note 225, at 1240 (describing the difference between condi-
tional funding statutes that require state program creation and those that require merely 
state acknowledgment of funding conditions). 
270 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). These statutes usually require states to 
operate programs that comply with certain federal requirements or meet minimum fed-
eral standards. See Engstrom, supra note 225, at 1240. As a result, such statutes condition 
the receipt of federal funds on states actively enacting certain regulatory schemes, as op-
posed to simply not engaging in certain behavior. Compare Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006) (indicating that “[a] State is eligible for assistance 
. . . if the State submits a plan that provides assurances to the Secretary [of Education] that 
the State has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that the State meets . . . the fol-
lowing conditions”), with 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (indicating that 
“[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational 
agency or institution . . . which has a policy or practice” but not requiring states to submit a 
compliant plan for federal approval). 
271 See Engstrom, supra note 225, at 1240–42. 
272 See Zeitlow, supra note 184, at 174 (describing such Spending Clause legislation as 
“regulat[ing] directly how recipients of federal funds treat individuals”). Prohibited behav-
ior statutes, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments of 1972, condition the receipt of federal funds on the recipient’s not engag-
ing in certain behavior, such as prohibiting discrimination. See About OCR, U.S. Depart-
ment of Educ. Off. for Civ. Rights, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/about 
ocr.html (last modified Mar. 23, 2005) (describing a number of the nondiscrimination 
statutes). Prohibited behavior statutes thus may not require state involvement, because a 
fund recipient may not be under direct state control. See Zeitlow, supra note 184, at 174. 
For example, private universities make the decision to accept federal funds independent 
of the state, and in so doing are bound by the conditions of FERPA and other conditional 
funding statutes. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 575–76; Bernstein, supra note 15, at 143. 
273 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b). 
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that the actor consenting to FERPA’s conditions is not the state legisla-
ture or even a high-ranking state official in the executive branch but a 
public university itself.274 Thus, by accepting federal funds, a university 
could realign its obligations under state law without any notice to the 
state officials who retain political liability for such consequences.275 
 In practice, however, this potential separation between the univer-
sity as the federal fund recipient and the state officials accountable to 
the public for the consequences is not common.276 In most states, state 
legislatures have some oversight of the budgets for public university 
systems, even if financial decisions are generally delegated to the uni-
versities or to a state agency overseeing them.277 Further, because state 
legislatures create the public university systems in many states, they at a 
minimum impliedly consent to universities’ financial decisions through 
                                                                                                                      
274 See id.; Hills, supra note 264, at 860–61. This is particularly true when FERPA and oth-
er prohibited behavior statutes have conditions that attach even when just one student at-
tends the university and uses a federal student loan to pay tuition. See Grove City, 465 U.S. at 
575–76; cf. Pell and Direct Loan Data Flows, U.S. Department of Educ., http://www.direct. 
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tors in the Classroom: Why State Legislatures Cannot Decide Higher Education Curricula, 54 Am. U. 
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contract metaphor. See Engdahl, supra note 14, at 530. The contract analogy of the offer of 
federal funds and the state’s acceptance of the accompanying conditions is at its weakest 
for a conditional funding statute like FERPA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); Engdahl, supra note 
14, at 530. This is because it is not clear that the state legislature, which is ultimately re-
sponsible for the impact of FERPA on existing regulatory schemes, is the party actually 
entering into the contract. See Engdahl, supra note 14, at 528; cf. Hills, supra note 264, at 
860–61 (discussing the role a negotiating state official would play). If a university accepts 
the funds without consulting the state legislature, but in turn takes less funding from the 
state because of the federal contribution, then the state is in essence a third-party benefici-
ary of the contract, and may or may not have a right to bring an enforcement action. See 
Engdahl, supra note 14, at 528. 
276 See Neal H. Hutchens, Preserving the Independence of Public Higher Education: An Ex-
amination of State Constitutional Autonomy Provisions for Public Colleges and Universities, 35 J.C. 
& U.L. 271, 271 & n.3 (2009). 
277 See id.; see also State Higher Educ. Exec. Officers, State Tuition, Fees, and Fi-
nancial Assistance Policies for Public Colleges and Universities 2010–11, at 7–9 
(2011) (demonstrating the varied ways in which state legislatures are involved in tuition-
setting and thus impliedly in university system financial decisions); cf. Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. §§ 3333.021, 3333.03, 3333.04 (2005 & Supp. 2011) (empowering a governor-
appointed chancellor to make decisions about state-funded colleges and universities, but 
requiring the chancellor to file a financial report with the state legislature prior to taking 
any action that could have an impact on a university’s “revenue or expenditures”). 
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delegated authority.278 Even in states with constitutionally autonomous 
universities, which operate independent of the state government, the 
state executive and legislative branches often have some input into the 
university system’s budget.279 The state legislature or high-ranking state 
officials in the executive branch thus presumably have some, albeit po-
tentially minimal, awareness of the federal funds’ offsetting the need 
for state expenditures and could intervene if desired.280 
 Thus, most if not all public university governance structures allow 
for sufficient consent by “the state” under Dole, because the state offi-
cials who are responsible for preserving federalism values have some 
knowledge of a public university’s decision to accept federal funds.281 
As a result, FERPA passes muster under Dole’s consent requirement, 
even if it may not fully achieve the principles underlying the require-
ment of voluntary acceptance by state actors who are held accountable 
to state residents in their decisions to accept federal funding conditions 
and their consequences.282 
 In sum, FERPA’s conditions attach to spending in furtherance of 
the general welfare, have a nexus to an important federal interest in 
privacy, are free of any requirements of unconstitutional behavior on 
the part of the state, and are unambiguous to the extent required by 
                                                                                                                      
278 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-101 (West 2011) (indicating legislative intent 
to create public postsecondary programs and delegating such authority to a commission 
on higher education, but reserving “ultimate authority” to the state legislature); Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 351.011 (2011) (establishing a public university system); cf. Thro, supra note 14, at 
953 & n.17 (noting that courts perceive public universities as “an arm of the State”). 
279 See Hutchens, supra note 276, at 274–75 (identifying at least seven states as having 
constitutionally autonomous public university systems); State Higher Educ. Exec. Offi-
cers, supra note 277, at 7–9 (demonstrating that the same seven states take different ap-
proaches to involving the state legislative and executive branches in financial decision 
making). In theory, in states with constitutionally autonomous university systems, the state 
legislative and executive branches could be unaware of universities’ decisions to accept 
federal funds. See State Higher Educ. Exec. Officers, supra note 277, at 7–9. In this 
situation, the state government would not fulfill its role of making the choice state resi-
dents would want of whether to accept limitations on the state’s autonomy in exchange for 
the federal funds. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168. Despite this theoretical possibility, states 
with constitutionally autonomous university systems tend to preserve some role for the 
state government in university oversight. See Hutchens, supra note 276, at 274–75; cf. Pri-
mer, supra note 246, at 6–7 (describing the involvement of the various branches of state 
government in setting the California public university system’s budget); Hutchens, supra 
note 276, at 272 (recognizing California as a state with constitutionally autonomous public 
universities). 
280 See State Higher Educ. Exec. Officers, supra note 277, at 7–9. 
281 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; State Higher Educ. Exec. Of-
ficers, supra note 277, at 7–9. 
282 See New York, 505 U.S. at 168; Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
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Dole.283 FERPA’s conditions raise some concerns because the decision to 
accept them has the potential to bypass the state legislature, thereby 
compromising the premise underlying Dole that state legislatures ac-
tively consent to FERPA’s terms.284 Nonetheless, given the laxity with 
which courts currently apply the Dole criteria, coupled with the in-
volvement by state legislatures through delegating decision-making 
power, FERPA in most states will survive the Dole analysis as a constitu-
tional use of Congress’s spending power.285 
V. Testing Validity and Applying Supremacy: How Courts 
Should Resolve the Conflict 
 After Part IV’s conclusion that FERPA will survive scrutiny as a con-
stitutional conditional funding statute, this Part proposes an analytical 
framework for courts to utilize in reviewing a potential conflict between 
FERPA and a state open records law.286 As a preliminary matter, a court 
should determine whether both FERPA and a state open records law 
present conflicting requirements regarding the disclosure of the re-
quested information.287 In many situations, records that redact person-
ally identifiable information will fulfill the open records request without 
violating FERPA’s privacy protections.288 But if both laws apply and si-
multaneously require and prohibit disclosure, the court should deter-
mine whether FERPA easily falls within one of the state open records 
law’s exemptions, such as an exemption specifically accommodating 
FERPA.289 
 If there is no clear exemption for FERPA, and both FERPA and the 
state open records law apply to the requested information, the court 
should assess FERPA’s validity using the Dole criteria and other devel-
opments in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to determine 
                                                                                                                      
283 See supra notes 234–262 and accompanying text. 
284 See supra notes 263–282 and accompanying text. 
285 See Hutchens, supra note 276, at 271 & n.3; Zeitlow, supra 184, at 173–74; supra 
notes 276–282 and accompanying text. 
286 See infra notes 287–305 and accompanying text. 
287 See Kaplin & Lee, supra note 13, at 273; Gardbaum, supra note 169, at 42. Suprem-
acy analysis requires assessing the requirements of the federal and state laws and consider-
ing how they interact. Gardbaum, supra note 169, at 42. If there is no conflict, then su-
premacy need not be used to determine the outcome. Cf. id. at 41–42 (providing an 
example of a California statutory scheme). 
288 See Peltz, supra note 20, at 185 (noting that often FERPA and the state open records 
law can be complied with simultaneously). 
289 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 40.25.120(a)(5) (2010) (specifically exempting FERPA); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.243(2) (West Supp. 2011) (same); see also supra notes 95–105 
and accompanying text (describing state open records laws’ student records exemptions). 
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whether the Supremacy Clause should dictate the outcome.290 A Dole 
analysis is necessary because the Supremacy Clause can resolve a direct 
conflict between state and federal law only if the federal law is valid.291 
Although there is a presumption that Congress acts constitutionally and 
a doctrine guiding courts to avoid constitutional questions, it is appro-
priate to reach the question of constitutionality when a court is faced 
with reconciling state and federal laws in conflict.292 Courts thus should 
not assume that FERPA constitutes a requirement, or that it is so critical 
that it must apply, or that it is “just money.”293 Instead, courts should 
conduct a reasoned analysis of whether FERPA is valid.294 
 The Dole analysis will likely vary by state, in part because courts in 
different jurisdictions may apply the Dole analysis differently and in part 
because the precise public university decision-making structures in 
                                                                                                                      
290 See Clark, supra note 171, at 91, 100 (urging that the Supremacy Clause requires this 
constitutionality analysis prior to conducting a supremacy analysis); Seligmann, supra note 
213, at 1071 (noting that Dole defines the constitutional limits of conditional funding stat-
utes); see also Daggett, supra note 17, at 99 (noting that FERPA sometimes does not fall 
within an exemption). 
291 See Clark, supra note 171, at 101. 
292 See id. at 100, 101 (stating that courts can and should engage in a review of both the 
state law and the constitutionality of the federal law when a conflict of laws arises); William 
K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 
831, 836, 842–43 (2001) (describing the presumption of constitutionality and the constitu-
tional avoidance doctrine). The constitutional avoidance doctrine instructs courts to avoid 
deciding difficult constitutional questions by choosing a “plausible interpretation” of a 
contested statute. Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Rob-
erts Court, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181, 181–82. At least one scholar has suggested that federal 
courts too frequently address constitutional questions regarding issues that can be decided 
on other grounds. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. 
L. Rev. 847, 850, 851, 858 (2005). But see Kelley, supra, at 835 (arguing that the avoidance 
canon is unnecessary and intrudes upon the Executive’s role); Note, Should the Supreme 
Court Presume That Congress Acts Constitutionally? The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Reli-
ance on Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1798, 1798, 
1800 (2002) (arguing that the presumption that Congress acts constitutionally is unwar-
ranted because Congress is subject to political pressures that raise questions about whether 
it acts constitutionally). This Part’s proposal recognizes that constitutional issues should be 
adjudicated only when necessary by emphasizing that a court should not turn to the analy-
sis of FERPA’s constitutionality unless the court has concluded that both FERPA and the 
state open records law apply to the requested information, and the state open records law 
provides no clear exception to accommodate FERPA. See supra notes 287–290 and accom-
panying text. 
293 See, e.g., United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 809 & n.11 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that FERPA constituted a binding requirement on universities receiving fed-
eral funds); Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 589 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (concluding that 
FERPA was merely a federal funding condition, not a binding law); Osborn v. Bd. of Re-
gents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 647 N.W.2d 158, 167, 168 (Wis. 2002) (concluding that the 
federal funds attached to FERPA were so significant that FERPA must be binding). 
294 See Clark, supra note 171, at 101. 
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each state impact the voluntary and knowing acceptance element of 
the analysis.295 Although FERPA passes Dole’s low bar for constitutional 
spending conditions on first glance, a more nuanced reading of FERPA 
in a state-specific context or a change in the Dole jurisprudence could 
lead to a different result.296 Because of the variation in states’ ap-
proaches to overseeing public university financial decisions, courts 
should pay particular attention to the notice and consent require-
ment.297 Given the potential for fluctuation in the analysis of condi-
tional funding statutes’ validity, it is important that a court either con-
ducts its own analysis of FERPA’s constitutionality as applied to the state 
or rely on controlling precedent establishing FERPA’s validity under 
Dole.298 
 If a court concludes that FERPA is a valid exercise of Congress’s 
power to place conditions on federal funds, then a court should inter-
pret an “otherwise prohibited” exemption to the state open records law 
as encompassing FERPA’s terms, or else it should use the Supremacy 
Clause to displace the contrary state law requirement.299 In states where 
the open records law does not contain an “otherwise prohibited” ex-
emption, FERPA must trump contrary state law because it is a valid 
conditional funding statute and therefore the Supremacy Clause dic-
tates its relationship with state law.300 Thus, when a public university 
receives federal funds, a reviewing court must enforce FERPA as federal 
                                                                                                                      
295 Cf. Baker & Berman, supra note 191, at 465–66 (acknowledging some variation in 
courts’ interpretations of the Dole requirements); State Higher Educ. Exec. Officers, 
supra note 277, at 7–9 (depicting the variety of state approaches to involving different 
branches of government in university financial decisions). 
296 See Baker & Berman, supra note 191, at 524–25 (advocating for a change in the ju-
risprudence); Engstrom, supra note 225, at 1202 (suggesting the need for new, “reasonable 
constraints on the spending power without unduly preferencing state autonomy inter-
ests”); supra notes 283–285 and accompanying text (concluding that FERPA survives a Dole 
analysis); supra notes 269–280 and accompanying text (discussing differences in state pub-
lic university governance structures that may impact Dole’s consent requirement). 
297 See Seligmann, supra note 213, at 1071, 1080; cf. State Higher Educ. Exec. Offi-
cers, supra note 277, at 7–9 (illustrating the variability in states’ approaches to public uni-
versity finances). 
298 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–08 (1987); Clark, supra note 171, at 
100–01. 
299 See Merrill, supra note 162, at 759, 779; cf. Brief for Ohio Legal Rights Service et al. 
as Amici Curiae at 12–13, 21–22, ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ., 958 N.E.2d 575 (Ohio 
2011) (No. 2011-1177) (arguing that FERPA should fall within an “otherwise prohibited” 
exemption to the Ohio Public Records Act, or else FERPA must trump the Public Records 
Act via the Supremacy Clause). 
300 See Gardbaum, supra note 169, at 41; supra notes 283–285 and accompanying text 
(concluding that FERPA is valid). 
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law so long as the court concludes that FERPA’s conditions are valid as 
applied to that university under Dole.301 
 Courts are the appropriate venue for determining the relationship 
between FERPA and state open records laws.302 With important consti-
tutional principles at stake, such as the Supremacy Clause and state 
sovereignty, the courts stand in the best position to mediate between 
these principles.303 Further, courts have the power to review the validity 
of conditional funding statutes and a duty to do so under the Suprem-
acy Clause.304 Additionally, judicial resolution of the conflict between 
state open records laws and FERPA is critical for facilitating uniformity 
in FERPA’s interpretation and ensuring Congress’s goal of achieving 
minimum student privacy protections in states that have accepted the 
contingent funds.305 
Conclusion 
 The dual requirements of FERPA and state open records laws are a 
source of strife for public universities across the country. In attempting 
to resolve conflicts between the two requirements, some courts have 
only exacerbated it. Swayed by the argument that FERPA compliance is 
optional because it is a conditional funding statute, these courts have 
exposed public universities to dual liability by refusing to recognize 
FERPA nondisclosure requirements as an exemption from state open 
records laws. 
 A stronger understanding of the relationship between the Su-
premacy Clause and the constitutionality of conditional funding stat-
utes authorized by the Spending Clause must guide judicial review of 
                                                                                                                      
301 See Clark, supra note 171, at 130; cf. Gaubatz, supra note 242, at 598 (indicating that 
states must comply with RLUIPA because RLUIPA is valid and the states accepted the 
funds on which RLUIPA places conditions). 
302 See Merrill, supra note 162, at 759, 779 (analyzing institutional capacity for appro-
priate decision making regarding preemption, and concluding that courts are the most 
well suited for deciding whether a federal law displaces a state law). Both state and federal 
courts may assess whether a federal law is a valid exercise of Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers, such that the Supremacy Clause can apply. See Clark, supra note 171, at 102–03, 105. 
303 See Clark, supra note 171, at 124; Merrill, supra note 162, at 759, 779. 
304 See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420, 422–23 (1970); Clark, supra note 171, at 
119; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24, 53–54 (1981) 
(White, J., dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the burden of withdrawing funding for 
noncompliance with conditions does not fall exclusively to the administrative agency en-
forcing the statute and noting instead that the Court holds certain powers, such as issuing 
injunctions or ordering specific performance, until the state chooses to no longer accept 
the federal funds). 
305 See Joint Statement, supra note 53, at 39,863; Daggett, supra note 17, at 112–13. 
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conflicts between FERPA and state open records laws. When a conflict 
between FERPA and a state open records law arises, courts must deter-
mine whether FERPA constitutes a valid conditional funding statute, 
using the Dole criteria and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. If 
it does, courts must engage in traditional supremacy analysis to deter-
mine if FERPA displaces the contrary state law. 
 Despite the criticisms of the propriety of the Dole test, this ap-
proach more adequately considers the principles of federalism and 
state sovereignty than courts’ current approaches. The result should be 
more consistent implementation of Congress’s policy goals, and an en-
couragement for states to think more comprehensively about the rela-
tionship between federal funding and their own regulatory schemes. 
Although FERPA and state open records laws will remain in constant 
tension because they promote competing goals, courts can help univer-
sities, the media, and state legislatures understand their rights and ob-
ligations under both through careful application of constitutional con-
ditional funding and supremacy analysis in succession. 
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